Transparency and Disclosure by Ring, Diane M.
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
1-1-2017
Transparency and Disclosure
Diane M. Ring
Boston College Law School, diane.ring@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Taxation-
Transnational Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Diane M. Ring. "Transparency and Disclosure." United Nations Handbook on Selected Issues in Protecting the Tax Base of Developing
Countries, Second Edition (2017): 571-652.
571
Chapter X
Transparency and disclosure
Diane Ring*
1 . Introduction
1 .1 Base erosion and profit shifting and tax information
Across the globe, countries increasingly express the concern that they 
are facing serious financial challenges from base erosion and profit 
shifting (BEPS). Without a stable and adequate tax base, countries 
lose the financial capacity to provide the infrastructure, social ser-
vices and development opportunities important to their citizens. In 
response, the G20 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) organized the project on BEPS. Much of 
the project has been focused on substantive law—the rules and prac-
tices that can allow the tax base of a country to be eroded and profits to 
be shifted out of the country. But the project recognizes that improved 
substantive tax rules alone are not sufficient to guarantee the tax base 
of a country. Without adequate transparency and disclosure of tax 
information to the taxing authorities, even the most carefully designed 
substantive tax rules will fail to protect the base. Thus, an important 
part of BEPS work targets the more administrative issues of transpar-
ency and disclosure. Ultimately, the goal is to ensure that tax authori-
ties have adequate and appropriate access to the information necessary 
for the effective administration of the tax law. As part of this mission, 
the OECD project on BEPS has included the development of standards 
for information reporting by multinational enterprises—referred to as 
“country-by-country reporting” (see section 3.3.2 below).
1 .2 Broader context for tax information issues
BEPS work on transparency and disclosure is not occurring in a 
vacuum. Existing tools offer tax administrators different avenues for 
*Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, United States of America.
572
Diane ring
accessing information. Such tools include: bilateral tax treaties—based 
on the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries 1  (United Nations Model 
Convention) and/or the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2  
(OECD Model Convention)—tax information exchange agreements 
(TIEAs), regional agreements, and the work of the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (see sec-
tions 5.2–5.6 below). Additionally, there are new developments taking 
place outside the formal OECD project on BEPS, some initiated by 
individual countries, others by regional networks or other interna-
tional bodies, including: intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) (see 
section 4.5 below), automatic exchange of information agreements, the 
Common Reporting Standard (CRS) for automatic exchange (see sec-
tion 4.3 below), increased attention to the Multilateral Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (section 5.4 below) 
and automatic exchange of tax rulings among jurisdictions (section 4.7 
below). More recently, transparency regarding the beneficial owner-
ship of entities has gained traction as the next frontier on transpar-
ency (see section 4.6 below). Although the primary focus of global 
work on transparency and disclosure has targeted exchange with and 
disclosure to governments, there is a related and active, but distinct, 
debate over whether and to what degree such information should be 
made public.
1 .3 Scope of the chapter
The purpose of this chapter is to provide developing countries with an 
overview of both the new developments in transparency and disclo-
sure as well as existing options for obtaining information. Some of the 
new developments remain in progress. But the examination provided 
below of the key goals, concerns, advantages and disadvantages of 
various options (including existing methods and newly proposed ones) 
 1 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United 
Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Develop-
ing Countries (New York: United Nations, 2011).
 2 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (Paris: OECD, 2014).
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may help countries evaluate their own circumstances and determine 
which options make the most sense for them in their efforts to curb 
BEPS. Given the newness of certain proposals (for example, actions 
taken under the OECD project on BEPS, including country-by-country 
(CbC) reporting), this chapter will devote more attention to reviewing 
the content and implementation of those options with which countries 
may be less familiar.
1 .4 Pervasive questions in transparency and disclosure
Regardless of the specific mechanism for providing information to tax 
administrators, a number of universal questions arise: (a) What type 
of information must be provided? (b) How difficult will it be for the 
taxpayer to provide that information? (c) How will the information 
be provided? (d) What kind of technology and infrastructure will be 
needed by the taxpayers and the country to implement this system? 
(e) To whom will the information be distributed? (f) What are the 
permissible uses of the information? (g) Does the country have the 
capacity to meaningfully use the information? and (h) How will data 
protection and taxpayer privacy be ensured? The success, failure and 
impact of a given regime for providing tax information will depend 
significantly upon the responses to these concerns. That said, there is 
no single appropriate response to these questions. By examining each 
of the new emerging information regimes, as well as the existing ones, 
against the backdrop of these questions, a country can determine its 
own most effective path towards appropriately protecting its tax base.
2 . Transparency and disclosure in the current tax world
2 .1 Overview
Recent efforts to ensure that countries have access to the information 
needed to meaningfully and effectively implement their tax laws have 
focused on the goals of “transparency” and “disclosure.” These terms 
appear in the OECD Action Plan on BEPS 3  and a variety of related 
 3 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Paris: OECD, 
2013), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf.
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documents and commentaries. These two terms are distinct from the 
related phrase “exchange of information”; thus, it may be useful to 
specify their meaning. All three play a critical role in guaranteeing 
that countries have the needed information.
2.1.1 Transparency
The term “transparency” reflects the idea that a country needs to 
understand how a taxpayer is conducting its business, structuring its 
operations and making investments in the country. To achieve this 
level of understanding, it may be necessary for the country to have a 
solid grasp of the activities, transactions and business structure of the 
taxpayer beyond the borders of its jurisdiction.
2.1.2 Disclosure
The term “disclosure” captures the idea that a country will need access 
to the information necessary to provide transparency regarding the 
activities of a taxpayer.
2.1.3 Exchange of information
The phrase “exchange of information” refers to the process (and 
mechanism) by which a country can obtain information regarding a 
taxpayer or the transactions of the taxpayer, typically from another 
country. The most well-known mechanisms for exchange of informa-
tion are bilateral tax treaty provisions based on Article 26 of both the 
United Nations and the OECD Model Conventions, discussed in sec-
tion 5.2 below.
2 .2 Current need for information
As noted above, and discussed more extensively in section 5.1 below, 
the demand for taxpayer information by taxing authorities is not new. 
However, the current lack of transparency that many countries face 
(owing in part to insufficient disclosure) has become a significant 
problem. The growth in cross-border commerce by multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), both foreign and domestic, has created a crisis in 
information for several reasons, as outlined below.
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2.2.1 Cross-border tax planning
Taxpayers with cross-border activities can engage in a wider array 
of tax planning techniques which can lead to base erosion and profit 
shifting. Substantive tax law changes that are designed to eliminate 
various arbitrage opportunities are one tool for attacking this problem. 
But substantive tax reform is insufficient given that arbitrage may be 
difficult to identify and fully eradicate. Adequate disclosure remains 
vital for the needed transparency regarding taxpayer activities.
2.2.2 Volume of cross-border business
Both the number of taxpayers engaging in cross-border business and 
the volume of business they conduct have been increasing. Thus, the 
scale of the base erosion and profit shifting at stake is significant. 
Correspondingly, the amount of information that countries must 
access, process and evaluate to stem the loss of tax base is also quite 
large. Mechanisms for providing information to countries must be tai-
lored to promote the goal of transparency and understanding.
2.2.3 Role of developing countries in the global economy
Developing countries have experienced significant growth in inbound 
investment by foreign multinationals as well as in outbound activities 
of their own multinationals. Income generated by these MNEs forms a 
critical portion of the tax base and, as noted in section 2.2.1 above, is 
especially susceptible to base erosion and profit shifting tax planning. 4 
For all countries facing such base erosion and profit shifting 
from multinationals, the ability to access and use tax information 
is vital. However, developing countries may find that they encoun-
ter serious barriers to securing needed information, compared with 
other jurisdictions. Not only do developing countries often experience 
 4 OECD, Measuring and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11—2015 Final Report 
(Paris: OECD, 2015) (noting that the “fiscal effects [of BEPS] on developing 
countries, as a percentage of their GDP . . . are higher than in developed 
countries given the greater reliance on CIT revenues and often weaker tax 
enforcement capabilities of developing countries”), at 79, available at http://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/measuring-and-monitoring-beps-action-
11-2015-final-report_9789264241343-en.
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a number of domestic constraints on their ability to access and use 
taxpayer information (see section 2.2.4.2 below), they also may find 
it more difficult to obtain information from other jurisdictions (see 
section 2.2.4.3 below). Additionally, to the extent that foreign multi-
nationals pose a greater information transparency and disclosure risk 
than domestic ones, developing countries face a distinct challenge. 
These countries typically have a substantial amount of inbound invest-
ment relative to outbound and therefore have more foreign multina-
tional taxpayers than domestic ones.
2.2.4 Informational challenges for developing countries
As noted in section 2.2.3 above, developing countries are especially 
dependent upon corporate taxation of MNEs for their tax base. To 
the extent that MNEs are able to engage in successful BEPS transac-
tions, developing countries typically have fewer alternative tax bases 
upon which to draw (for example, individual taxes and consumption 
taxes). 5  Thus, BEPS problems can be particularly significant for these 
jurisdictions. The costs of BEPS to developing countries may be more 
severe and the impediments to overcoming BEPS may also be greater 
for these jurisdictions. Developing countries may experience a number 
of hurdles in securing information, transparency and disclosure from 
multinational businesses. A review of these barriers directs attention 
to the changes that may be needed and allows reform proposals to be 
measured against the list of challenges so as to see where and to what 
extent such proposals can help. The impediments can be grouped into 
roughly three categories: (a) domestic law; (b) domestic enforcement; 
and (c) international support.
2.2.4.1 Domestic law impediments
Some countries already have in place domestic law reporting require-
ments that provide relevant taxpayer information. Such reporting 
requirements can include the obligation of the taxpayer to provide 
information regarding: (a) foreign related entities and related-party 
 5 See, for example, OECD, Part I of the Report to G20 Development Work-
ing Group on the Impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries (Paris: OECD, July 
2014), at 11, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/part-1-of-report-to-g20-
dwg-on-the-impact-of-beps-in-low-income-countries.pdf.
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transactions; (b) foreign financial assets and accounts; (c) discrepan-
cies between tax reporting and accounting treatment; and (d) certain 
kinds of tax shelters or otherwise suspect transactions and structures. 
This information can be useful in helping a country determine whether 
to initiate an audit, and where and how to direct its attention in an 
audit. If a developing country does not have such reporting regimes 
in place, changes to domestic law reporting requirements may be one 
step in the process of enhancing transparency and disclosure. The final 
recommendations from the OECD project on BEPS regarding Actions 
12 and 13 in the OECD Action Plan can serve as a guide for countries 
that are just starting to institute such reporting requirements (see sec-
tions 3.4 and 3.3 below, respectively).
The work of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange 
of Information for Tax Purposes (Global Forum) identifies other 
fundamental domestic law features that can inhibit (or conversely, 
facilitate) transparency. The peer review process of the Global Forum 
serves as a mechanism for assessing the compliance of a country with 
“the international standard of transparency and exchange of informa-
tion”  6  (see section 5.6 below). In evaluating a jurisdiction against this 
standard, the Global Forum reviews a number of key dimensions of 
the domestic law critical to transparency. One set of factors looks to 
the availability of information on the following topics: (a) ownership 
and identity information for entities and structures; (b) accounting 
records; and (c) banking information for account holders. Another set 
of factors looks at the rules and procedures governing access to that 
information. The expectation is that the designated tax authority in 
the country (the competent authority) has the power under domestic 
law to obtain such information and provide it under an exchange of 
information mechanism, while respecting taxpayer rights. 7  Although 
 6 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes, Tax Transparency 2014: Report on Progress (Paris: OECD, 
2014), at 16, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/GFannual-
report2014.pdf; see also ibid., Progress Report to the G20 Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors: Update on Effectiveness and On-going Monitor-
ing (September 2014).
 7 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for 
Tax Purposes, Information Brief (November 2013), at 6–7, available at http://
www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/global_forum_background%20brief.pdf.
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the focus of the peer review process and recommendations may be 
directed towards enhancing exchange of information with other coun-
tries, many of the same rules, practices and procedures that enable a 
country to participate actively in the exchange of information would 
improve the ability of a country to implement its own tax system and 
limit base erosion and profit shifting. The same availability of and 
access to information that enables a jurisdiction to be a global partner 
in sharing information with other countries would facilitate its own 
tax enforcement and revenue collection. Thus, engagement in the work 
of the Global Forum may be useful for developing countries, regard-
less of the amount of taxpayer information sought from their jurisdic-
tion (see section 5.6 below).
A more targeted form of peer review, assessing for compliance 
with BEPS Action 13: Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation 
and Country-by-Country Reporting, is being implemented under the 
auspices of the OECD (see section 3.3 below). 8 
2.2.4.2 Domestic enforcement impediments
All countries face the question of whether their administrative system 
is effective in using the information available. However, developing 
countries may face barriers to deriving maximum benefit from the 
information that they currently possess (or that they may be able to 
acquire in the immediate future). 9  These barriers can include: (a) lim-
ited audit staff; (b) audit staff without the required training and expe-
rience (for example, an ability to review foreign language documents, 
a detailed understanding of transfer pricing and tax law); (c) regular 
attrition of highly trained staff; (d) technological limitations to the 
ability to receive, manage, store and work with different types of data; 
(e) inadequate systems for identifying and matching taxpayers; and (f) 
existing culture of limited tax compliance.
 8 OECD, BEPS Action 13 on Country-by-Country Reporting: Peer Review 
Documents (Paris: OECD, 2017), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/
beps-action-13-on-country-by-country-reporting-peer-review-documents.
pdf; see also OECD, “Country-by-country reporting,” available at http://
www.oecd.org/tax/beps/country-by-country-reporting.htm.
 9 See generally, OECD, Part I of the Report to G20 Development Working 
Group on the Impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries, supra note 5.
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Any recommendations on how to increase access to information 
and improve transparency and disclosure (for example, recommen-
dations pursuant to Actions 11, 12 and 13 of the OECD Action Plan 
on BEPS) should be evaluated against the backdrop of such domes-
tic enforcement impediments. For example, transparency and disclo-
sure recommendations that could ease any of the current impediments 
might be particularly attractive to developing countries, even if other 
options were more effective for developed economies. To the extent that 
a particular recommendation would yield more limited benefits for a 
developing country owing to domestic enforcement constraints, adop-
tion of that recommendation might be paired with a concrete support 
plan designed to build the capacity of the tax administration to use 
the information effectively so as to curb BEPS in its jurisdiction. 10  In 
recognition of the capacity-building needs of many developing coun-
tries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the OECD, the United 
Nations and the World Bank announced their joint engagement on 
a “Platform for Collaboration on Tax” in April 2016. The accompany-
ing “Concept Note” emphasized that this collaboration among these 
major international organizations aims to offer support and assistance 
to developing countries. 11  As an example of such support, in January 
2017, the Platform announced that it had designed a “draft toolkit” to 
provide developing countries with assistance in transfer pricing anal-
ysis and implementation, and in particular with the identification 
of “comparables.”  12  Additionally, in July 2015, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the OECD initiated a joint 
 10 See, for example, C20, “Position Paper Background: Governance” (7 
August 2014), at 6, which encourages research regarding the cost/benefit 
trade-off for automatic exchange of information and the impact on develop-
ing countries.
 11 International Monetary Fund-OECD-United Nations-World Bank, 
“The Platform for Collaboration on Tax: Concept Note”, at 5 (19 April 2016), 
available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2016/pdf/pr16176.pdf.
 12 World Bank, “The Platform for Collaboration on Tax Invites Com-
ments on a Draft Toolkit Designed to Help Developing Countries Address 
the Lack of Comparables for Transfer Pricing Analyses,” (24 January 2017), 
available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/01/24/
the-platform-for-collaboration-on-tax-invites-comments-on-a-draft-
toolkit-designed-to-help-developing-countries-address-the-lack-of-compa-
rables-for-transfer-pricing-analyses.
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project for building tax capacity, “Tax Inspectors without Borders” 
(TIWB). As part of the TIWB mission, “tax experts from both devel-
oped and developing countries are deployed to work side-by-side with 
local tax officials on tax audits.”  13  Among the criteria that the TIWB 
has developed for assessing success in building tax capacity within a 
jurisdiction are: (a) increases in requests made by the jurisdiction to 
other countries for exchange of information; and (b) increased will-
ingness among taxpayers to “provide data and information to tax 
administration”, characterized as “voluntary disclosure of data and 
information.”  14 
2.2.4.3 International impediments
The success of a country in tackling BEPS will depend in part upon its 
ability to actively engage with the international community and obtain 
information from other jurisdictions. The most obvious examples of 
such engagement arise under exchange of information provisions in 
bilateral tax treaties (based on Article 26 of the United Nations and 
OECD Model Conventions) and under TIEAs (such as those based 
on the OECD Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax 
Matters) (see sections 5.2 and 5.3 below). Therefore, the more limited 
the network of bilateral treaties and TIEAs of a country, the more con-
strained it may be in gathering needed information. In the same vein, 
bilateral tax treaties and TIEAs whose terms impose significant bar-
riers to exchange (such as the level of information that the requester 
must provide, or the nature of the tax violation in the requesting State) 
effectively reduce the value of these agreements as meaningful tools 
for developing countries.
International mechanisms for sharing information across 
borders are important in their own right as independent and currently 
existing tools for responding to BEPS problems. But the availability of 
these mechanisms may also be important as the OECD BEPS project 
final recommendations are being implemented across the globe. The 
 13 OECD-UNDP, Tax Inspectors Without Borders, “Progress Report and 
2016 Work Plan for Discussion and Approval,” at 1 (16 April 2016), available 
at http://www.tiwb.org/About/governing-board/governing-board-progress-
report-and-2016-work-plan.pdf.
 14 Ibid., at 16.
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ability of a country to benefit fully from BEPS recommendations 
will depend upon its treaty network. For example, as discussed more 
extensively in section 3.3., access to CbC reports under BEPS Action 
13 requires a country to obtain that information from the home juris-
diction of the MNE parent. The expected mechanism is an exchange of 
information provision in an existing treaty (including the Multilateral 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters). 15  
Thus, developing jurisdictions, particularly those with more limited 
treaty networks (tax treaties and TIEAs) will find it harder to obtain 
the information and proceed with their efforts to stop base erosion 
and profit shifting. This issue is widely acknowledged, and is discussed 
more extensively in section 3.3.5.2 below.
2 .3 Response to increased need for information
The focus of the global tax community on BEPS has included recogni-
tion of the centrality of information to tax administrations. As dis-
cussed below, the G20 also supports the OECD Action Plan on BEPS, 
including its attention to transparency, disclosure and information. 
The Action Plan operates against the backdrop of existing mechanisms 
for the provision of information. Its value added derives from its focus 
on the information-driven crisis points in BEPS. It targets the gaps 
created by the current system of providing information to tax authori-
ties that leave countries susceptible to BEPS through related-party 
transactions, transfer pricing and cross-border arbitrage.
However, the BEPS setting is not the only context in which 
global tax actors continue to examine how tax administrations can 
be strengthened through transparency and disclosure. In some cases, 
individual countries have taken action that has triggered a more global 
response. For example, the United States implementation of the Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) regime, which requires foreign 
financial entities to disclose information regarding United States 
taxpayers to the United States tax authorities or face penalties, has led 
 15 OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country 
Reporting, Action 13—2015 Final Report (Paris: OECD, 2015), available at http://
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/transfer-pricing-documentation-and-coun-
try-by-country-reporting-action-13-2015-final-report_9789264241480-en.
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to the signing of IGAs (see section 4.5 below). Additionally, other coun-
tries increasingly seek to secure similar commitments for taxpayer 
information from foreign financial entities. In yet other cases, interna-
tional bodies are promoting enhanced access to information through 
automatic information exchange (see section 4.2 and 4.7 below) and/
or through the expansion of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (section 5.4 below).
Thus, while the need to acquire information is as old as the 
international tax system itself, the current climate for tax administra-
tions differs from that of the past. The scale of information needed, its 
complexity and its importance have all grown dramatically. Although 
traditional information-based tools for facilitating tax compliance 
remain relevant and valuable, close examination of the ways in which 
transparency and disclosure can be enhanced is now a critical topic for 
countries. To that end, section 3 of this chapter reviews and analyses the 
work on transparency and disclosure carried out by the OECD project 
on BEPS. Section 4 then undertakes a similar examination of new devel-
opments in information-gathering occurring outside of the OECD 
project on BEPS. Finally, section 5 provides context for the new reforms 
and recommendations by revisiting more familiar tools and techniques 
currently available for enhancing transparency and disclosure.
As the review of each new and old information-related provision 
and practice reveals, there are no simple solutions to the complexity of 
today’s information-rich (and information-dependent) environment. 
There may be substantial agreement on the importance of transpar-
ency and disclosure as broad concepts, but the effort to translate those 
principles into specific practices and regimes unmasks the challenges 
and concerns outlined in section 1.4 above. A country’s assessment of 
the right balance and mix among these risks, trade-offs and benefits 
may vary depending upon its domestic infrastructure, economic posi-
tion, existing network of tax agreements and tools, and substantive 
tax system.
2 .4 Summary of the current tax environment and its 
connection to transparency and disclosure
Multinationals with significant cross-border business activities form 
an important part of today’s economy for all countries. The growth 
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in cross-border commerce has increased the opportunity for tax 
planning and, correspondingly, the needs of countries for taxpayer 
information. Developing countries may confront a number of chal-
lenges as their tax administrators seek the information necessary 
for effective enforcement of the tax laws. The challenges include: (a) 
domestic law impediments (inadequate required reporting by multi-
nationals regarding assets, accounts and transactions); (b) constrained 
domestic enforcement (owing to limited audit staff; inexperienced 
staff; attrition of trained staff; and insufficient technological capac-
ity to receive, manage and store data, and to link taxpayers to data); 
and (c) international impediments (a limited treaty network and high 
treaty thresholds for requesting information). The OECD project on 
BEPS recognizes the centrality of tax information to meaningful tax 
administration and the action items discussed below explicitly seek 
to increase both the quality and the availability of relevant informa-
tion. But in addition to the OECD project on BEPS, transparency and 
disclosure is the subject of other international efforts to curtail base 
erosion and profit shifting, including the rising number of IGAs, the 
support for automatic exchange of information, and the expansion of 
treaty networks. Finally, the varied efforts to enhance countries’ access 
to information through both transparency and disclosure have been 
accompanied by a growing call for more public disclosure of tax infor-
mation. The public disclosure of tax and tax-related information is 
greatly debated, and the resulting tension is playing out on a national, 
regional and global level.
3 . BEPS and transparency and disclosure
3 .1 Overview of BEPS action items related to tax 
information, transparency and disclosure
The OECD Action Plan on BEPS released in July 2013 included two sig-
nificant action items related to the increased provision of information 
to countries by taxpayers: 16  Action 12: Require taxpayers to disclose 
 16 Other action items may, in a more limited manner, enhance transpar-
ency and disclosure through mechanisms not based on taxpayer provision 
of information. For example, Action 5: Counter harmful tax practices more 
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their aggressive tax planning arrangements; and Action 13: Re-examine 
transfer pricing documentation (including the “country-by-country 
reporting” template). The final reports were issued on 5 October 2015.
The most serious attention has been directed to Action 13 (trans-
fer pricing and related issues), which includes the recommendation for 
CbC reporting. This action item, which has been ranked as being of 
“high” relevance to developing countries, 17  is discussed extensively 
in section 3.3 below. The companion information-reporting provi-
sion, Action 12 (aggressive tax planning), which has been reported as 
being of “medium” relevance to developing countries, 18  is more briefly 
considered in section 3.4 below.
One additional action item, Action 11, seeks to improve the 
understanding of countries (and of the global tax community) of the 
“scale and economic impact” of BEPS by establishing “methodologies 
to collect and analyse data on BEPS and the actions to address it.” This 
action item, which has been listed as being of “high” relevance for 
developing countries, 19  is considered in section 3.2 below.
3 .2 Action 11: collect and analyse data on BEPS
Although Actions 12 and 13 share with Action 11 the common mission 
of helping countries more effectively address BEPS problems through 
improved knowledge and understanding, their focus and “solutions” 
are different. Actions 12 and 13 target specific taxpayer conduct 
through enhanced reporting requirements for actual taxpayers. Both 
Actions 12 and 13 change the kinds of information that taxpayers 
effectively, taking into account transparency and substance, focuses in part 
on “including compulsory spontaneous exchange on rulings related to pref-
erential regimes.” OECD, Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, 
Taking Into Account Transparency and Substance, Action 5—2015 Final Report 
(Paris: OECD, 2015), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/
countering-harmful-tax-practices-more-effectively-taking-into-account-
transparency-and-substance-action-5-2015-final-report_9789264241190-en.
 17 OECD, Part I of the Report to G20 Development Working Group on the 
Impact of BEPS in Low Income Countries, supra note 5, at 31.
 18 Ibid., at 30.
 19 Ibid.
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must provide to countries. The new information presumably will 
enable a country to evaluate a multinational taxpayer more effectively 
and accurately and identify conduct that is creating BEPS (either by 
aggressive planning or by cross-border related-party transactions and 
structures). In that way, Actions 12 and 13 function more as a support 
to and enhancement of the audit function.
3.2.1 Goals of Action 11
In contrast to Actions 12 and 13, Action 11 targets a more systemic 
goal—obtaining a comprehensive, overall picture of the BEPS problem. 
Action 11 identifies “[s]ix indicators of BEPS activity” that “highlight 
BEPS behaviours using different sources of data, employing different 
metrics, and examining different BEPS channels.”  20  Under Action 
11, ongoing analysis and monitoring of BEPS impacts across jurisdic-
tions and across time seek to determine the effects of BEPS and of BEPS 
countermeasures on overall tax receipts, total employment, geographic 
location of employment, investment in physical capital, investments 
in knowledge-based capital, tax competition, and so forth. 21  However, 
the Final Report observes that the use of the six BEPS indicators and 
the resulting BEPS analyses are “severely” hindered by “the limitations 
of the currently available data.”  22  The data to be collected pursuant to 
Action 5: Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking 
into Account Transparency and Substance and Action 13 (transfer 
pricing-related documentation, see section 3.3 below) are expected to 
be an important new source of BEPS-related data. Once the data and 
methodologies are in place to “measure” the problem, the indicators 
and tools to monitor the success of BEPS actions taken by countries can 
provide guidance on continuing challenges as well as areas of success. 23 
 20 OECD, Measuring and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11—2015 Final 
Report, supra note 4, at 15.
 21 Ibid., at 80; see also OECD, “Request for Input, BEPS Action 11: Estab-
lish methodologies to collect and analyse data on BEPS and the actions to 
address it” (4 August 2014), at 3, available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/public-
request-for-input-beps- action-11.pdf.
 22 OECD, Measuring and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11—2015 Final 
Report, supra note 4, at 16.
 23 Ibid., at 15 –16.
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The focus is on not only what is happening within a given coun-
try owing to BEPS, but also the “spillover” effects on other jurisdic-
tions. 24  This newly collected information, along with the diagnostic 
tools in Action 11, is expected to help policymakers and countries 
evaluate all of the changes implemented pursuant to the OECD Action 
Plan on BEPS and determine whether the implementation of steps 
under other BEPS action items are meeting their goals.
3.2.2 Data collection under Action 11 and its impact
Some of the data will be collected on an aggregate basis (such as foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and balance-of-payments data), but as noted 
in section 3.2.1 above, Action 11 also envisages that taxpayer-level 
data (financial statements, tax returns) will play an important role. 
We can expect that the taxpayer-level data portion of Action 11 will 
raise many of the same questions and concerns as Actions 12 and 
13. Thus, the examination of these questions in section 3.3 below in 
the context of CbC reporting should be relevant and helpful to the 
discussions surrounding implementation of Action 11 undertaken by 
governments and researchers. Data collection, reporting and analysis 
under Action 11, though potentially influential in the longer term, will 
have less immediate relevance for those developing countries seeking 
to protect their tax base.
3 .3 Action 13: transfer pricing–related documentation
3.3.1 Overview
Action 13 responds to the determination that transfer pricing is a cru-
cial facet of BEPS and that tax administrators face a serious problem 
in responding to these BEPS issues because of information asymmetry 
between tax authorities and taxpayers. Tax authorities need the ability 
 24 See, for example, International Monetary Fund, “Spillovers in Interna-
tional Corporate Taxation,” (2014) IMF Policy Paper, at 1, available at http://
www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/050914.pdf. It observes that “spillo-
vers [from the international aspects of corporate taxation] are especially 
marked and important for developing countries.” See also OECD, Measuring 
and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11—2015 Final Report, supra note 4, at 80, 99, 
(noting the importance of assessing and addressing spillover effects).
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to evaluate the global value chain of an MNE and to obtain detailed 
data on the structure of its activities, operations and intragroup trans-
actions. Taxpayers, too, may find current transfer pricing regimes 
unsatisfactory to the extent that varying transfer pricing documen-
tation standards and practices across countries place an unnecessary 
and unproductive burden on reporting taxpayers. 25 
Action 13 calls for a re-examination of transfer pricing docu-
mentation, with attention devoted to two potentially competing goals: 
enhancement of transparency for tax administration, and sensitivity 
to taxpayer compliance costs. But perhaps more importantly, Action 
13 seeks the establishment of rules that would require an MNE to 
“provide all relevant governments with needed information on their 
global allocation of the income, economic activity and taxes paid 
among countries according to a common template.”  26  This reporting 
template concept is known as “country-by-country reporting.”
The introduction in Action 13 of the new reporting format with 
new information has raised a number of questions that have dominated 
the discussion of CbC reporting. Briefly, the issues can be broadly identi-
fied as: (a) the kind of information required; (b) the burden on taxpayers; 
(c) the permitted recipients of the information; (d) the permitted uses of 
the information; (e) the ability of a country to use the information; (f) 
the protection of taxpayer data; and (g) the delivery mechanism. 27 
3.3.2 OECD introduction of Action 13
In October 2015, the OECD released the Final Report on Action 13 
regarding Transfer Pricing Documentation and CbC Reporting. 28  It 
 25 OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country 
Reporting, Action 13—2015 Final Report, supra note 15, at 10; see also OECD, 
Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 3, at 23.
 26 OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country 
Reporting, Action 13—2015 Final Report, supra note 15, at 9; see also OECD, 
Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 3, at 23.
 27 See, for example, OECD, Memorandum on Transfer Pricing Docu-
mentation and Country by Country Reporting (3 October 2013), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/memorandum-transfer-pricing-
documentation-and-country-by-country-reporting.pdf.
 28 OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country 
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identified the three core goals for transfer pricing documentation: 
(a) risk assessment: “to provide tax administrations with the informa-
tion necessary to conduct an informed transfer pricing risk assess-
ment”; (b) appropriate taxpayer pricing practices: “to ensure that 
taxpayers give appropriate consideration to transfer pricing require-
ments in establishing prices and other conditions for transactions 
between associated enterprises and in reporting the income derived 
from such transactions in their tax returns”; and (c) audit support: “to 
provide tax administrations with useful information to employ in con-
ducting an appropriately thorough audit of the transfer pricing prac-
tices of entities subject to tax in their jurisdiction.”  29 
3.3.3 Transfer pricing documentation and country-
by-country reporting under Action 13
Action 13 recommends a standardized reporting system for taxpayers, 
with three components: (a) the master file; (b) the CbC template; and 
(c) the local file.
3.3.3.1 Master file
The master file should contain “standardized information for all MNE 
group members.” The goal of this information is to provide an “overview 
of the MNE group business, including the nature of its global business 
operations, its overall transfer pricing policies, and its global allocation 
of income and economic activity in order to assist tax administrations in 
evaluating the presence of significant transfer pricing risk.”  30  The infor-
mation required in the master file covers five categories: (a) the group 
organizational structure; (b) a description of business or businesses; (c) 
Reporting, Action 13—2015 Final Report, supra note 15. The Final Report 
includes modifications reflecting input and comments received on the OECD 
Discussion Draft on Action 13, which had been released more than a year 
earlier, in January 2014: OECD, Public Consultation: Discussion Draft on 
Transfer Pricing Documentation and CbC Reporting (30 January 2014), avail-
able at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/discussion-draft-transfer-
pricing-documentation.pdf.
 29 OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country 
Reporting, Action 13—2015 Final Report, supra note 15, at 12.
 30 Ibid., at 14.
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the intangibles held by the group; (d) the intercompany financial activi-
ties; and (e) the financial and tax positions of the MNE.
The relative brevity of the description of the master file belies 
the number of complicated choices and options embedded in its 
design. One issue was whether to have MNEs prepare the file for the 
group as a whole or by line of business. The Final Report specifies that 
the taxpayer “should present the information in the master file for the 
MNE as a whole.”  31  But the report allows for the organization of infor-
mation by line of business, where appropriate—although emphasiz-
ing that “[e]ven where line of business presentation is selected, the 
entire master file consisting of all business lines should be available 
to each country in order to assure that an appropriate overview of the 
MNE group’s global business is provided.”  32  The Final Report reiter-
ated that the master file information is intended to provide a high-level 
risk overview and should be used consistent with that function (and, 
for example, should not replace actual audits and more detailed 
taxpayer-specific analysis and inquiry).
3.3.3.2 Country-by-country template
The CbC template requires taxpayer reporting on the following items: 
(a) revenue (related and unrelated party); (b) profit (loss) before income 
tax; (c) cash tax; (d) current year tax accruals; (e) stated capital; (f) accu-
mulated earnings; (g) number of employees; and (h) tangible assets. 33  
This information should be provided on a country-by-country basis 
(as opposed to entity-by-entity). The template should be accompanied 
by a list of all group entities and permanent establishments (PEs), by 
country, along with a specification of their major activities.
 31 Ibid., at 15.
 32 Ibid., at 15.
 33 Ibid., at 29. The January 2014 Discussion Draft for Action 13 had origi-
nally suggested 17 reporting items, but this was reduced following extensive 
taxpayer comments. See, for example, Kevin A. Bell, “Country-by-Country 
Template Won’t Require Entity-by-Entity Financial Details, Andrus Says,” 
BNA Transfer Pricing Report (10 April 2014), available at http://www.bna.
com/countrybycountry-template-wont-n17179889500/; see also OECD 
Update on BEPS Project—Webcast PowerPoint (2 April 2014), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/OECD-BEPS-Webcast-2April.pdf.
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The Final Report responded to several questions regarding the 
CbC template:
(a) Accounting approach: In addressing a number of ques-
tions that arose regarding the proper source of data used 
in the CbC report and whether the template should reflect 
a bottom-up approach using local statutory accounts, or 
whether the template should reflect top-down allocation of 
the group’s consolidated income, the Final Report noted:
 (i) The Reporting MNE should use the same data sources 
consistently from year to year in the CbC report;
 (ii) The Reporting MNE may “use data from its consolida-
tion reporting packages, from separate entity statutory 
financial statements, regulatory financial statements, 
or internal management accounts”; 34 
 (iii) The revenue, profit and tax reporting in the CbC tem-
plate need not be reconciled to the consolidated finan-
cial statements;
 (iv) If the Reporting MNE chooses to use statutory finan-
cials as the foundation for the CbC report, then “all 
amounts should be translated to the stated func-
tional currency of the Reporting MNE at the average 
exchange rate for the year”; 35 
 (v) Differences in accounting principles across jurisdic-
tions do not have to be reflected through adjustments.
(b) Taxes: Taxes paid “include[s] withholding taxes paid by 
other entities” (whether associated or independent) on 
behalf of the MNE group. 36 
(c) Cross-border related-party payments: The revenue reported 
on the CbC template should be divided into related party 
and unrelated party revenues. These revenue numbers 
“include revenues from sales of inventory and proper-
ties, services, royalties, interest, premiums and any other 
 34 OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country 
Reporting, Action 13—2015 Final Report, supra note 15, at 32.
 35 Ibid.
 36 Ibid., at 33.
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amounts,” but does not include payments that are treated 
by the payor jurisdiction as dividends. 37 
Thus, in summary, taxpayers have the flexibility to use either 
statutory account data or financial statement reporting packages to 
complete the template—if data usage is applied consistently across the 
group and across years. Information contained in the CbC template 
should provide tax authorities with a clearer picture of the relation-
ship between reported profits, taxes paid and the underlying details of 
economic activity (for example, tangible assets, employees, employee 
expense). The information provided through the CbC template offers 
countries the ability to assess the transfer pricing and base erosion 
risk they face with the multinational and thus determine where 
and how to audit. But acknowledging a serious concern of taxpay-
ers, the Final Report cautions against countries effectively bypassing 
detailed audit work and using the CbC data to assert transfer pric-
ing adjustments.
3.3.3.3 Local file
The third element in the Action 13 package of transfer pricing informa-
tion is the local file. The local file includes jurisdiction-specific infor-
mation that complements the master file in helping the country ensure 
that the taxpayer complies with the arm’s length principle and transfer 
pricing rules in its major transactions connected to that jurisdiction. 
Broadly, the local file includes more detailed information regarding 
relevant transactions between the MNE entity in the local jurisdiction 
and its related entities in other countries, such as financial details of 
the transactions, a comparability analysis for pricing, and “selection 
and application of the most appropriate transfer pricing method.”  38 
The Final Report contains an annex delineating the local file 
information. 39  The information is grouped into three categories:
(a) Local entity: The first concerns information regarding the 
local entity itself: its management structure, organiza-
tion chart, identification of individuals to whom the local 
 37 Ibid., at 33.
 38 Ibid., at 15.
 39 Ibid., at 27–28.
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management must report (and the jurisdiction of their 
principal offices), local entity business strategy, any recent 
participation by the local entity in a business restructuring, 
and key competitors.
(b) Controlled transactions: The second category pertains to 
information regarding controlled transactions involving 
the local entity. A more specific list of information is enu-
merated here, which goes to the core of how the taxpayer 
applies the transfer pricing rules:
 h Description of the transactions (for example, services, pur-
chase of goods, loans) and the context in which that trans-
action took place (for example, business activity, financial 
activity, cost contribution arrangement);
 h Aggregate charges for each category of transaction;
 h Identity of the related parties involved and the nature of 
their relationships;
 h Functional analysis of the taxpayer and the related entities 
regarding each category of controlled transactions (func-
tions performed, assets used, assets contributed, intangibles 
involved, risks borne and changes compared to prior years);
 h Identification and description of controlled-party transac-
tions that might impact the transaction in question;
 h Specification of the most appropriate transfer pricing method 
by category, the reasoning for the selection, which entity 
is the tested party (where relevant) and why, assumptions 
made in using the method, and financial information used;
 h If using a multi-year analysis, include an explanation  
why;
 h Information regarding comparables—how selected, search 
strategy, application of method, and relevant financial indi-
cators used in the analysis;
 h Any adjustments to comparables, to the tested party;
 h Copies of material intercompany agreements executed by 
the local entity;
 h Copies of unilateral, bilateral, and/or multilateral APAs, or 
other tax rulings, to which the local jurisdiction is not a 
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party but which are related to the controlled transactions 
included above;
 h Conclusions regarding the arm’s length status of related-party 
transactions based on application of the selected method.
(c) Financial information: The third category seeks financial 
information important to the application of transfer pric-
ing analysis: the annual financial accounts of a local entity 
(audited, if available), schedules showing how financial data 
that was used in the transfer pricing method is linked to 
the annual financial statements, and summary schedules 
of the financial data of the comparables and the source of 
that data.
3.3.4 Implementation issues under Action 13
Documentation and burden: Taxpayers are expected to price at arm’s 
length based on contemporaneous information, and prior to engaging in 
the transaction, with confirmation completed before filing the tax return. 
But Action 13 urges countries to consider the burden on the taxpayers 
when making documentation requests. For example, taxpayers that can 
reasonably demonstrate the absence of comparables (or their absence 
at an appropriate cost) should not be required to bear such a burden. 40  
Furthermore, the Final Report specifically does not recommend that 
transfer pricing documentation be certified by an outside auditor. 41 
Timing: Given the diversity in country expectations regard-
ing when documentation should be available (at the time of filing the 
return or by the time of audit) and how long taxpayers should have 
to respond to requests, the suggested best practice is to require that 
taxpayers have the local file ready by the time the tax return for the 
relevant year is filed (unless the jurisdiction practises contemporane-
ous auditing, which would require the information prior to the filing 
of the return). The master file should be updated, if necessary, by the 
filing date for the ultimate MNE parent’s tax return. In countries for 
which final statutory financial statements and related CbC reporting 
data are not available until after the tax return is due, the best practice 
 40 Ibid., at 16.
 41 Ibid., at 20.
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would allow for extension of completion of the CbC template to one 
year after the last day of the fiscal year of the MNE parent.
Materiality: Conscious of the need to balance the competing 
interests of countries (seeking access to transfer pricing information) 
and taxpayers (seeking a “reasonable” documentation burden), Action 
13 recommends documentation requirements with materiality thresh-
olds based on the “size and nature of the local economy, the impor-
tance of the MNE group in that economy, and the size and nature of 
local operating entities, in addition to the overall size and nature of the 
MNE group.”  42  For example, many jurisdictions offer simplified trans-
fer pricing documentation rules for small and medium-sized enterprises. 
Nonetheless, such smaller businesses would be expected to provide data 
and documentation regarding material cross-border related-party trans-
actions upon request and also to complete the CbC template.
Document retention: Again, balancing taxpayer burdens and 
the need of a country to access information, the Final Report recom-
mends that tax administrators take into account the difficulty in locat-
ing documents from prior years, and that they should make such 
requests only when there is a “good reason” relating to a transaction 
under review. To assist in the balance of burden and need, taxpay-
ers should be permitted to store the documentation in a manner they 
deem appropriate (electronic, paper, and so forth) as long as it can be 
produced in a useable form to the tax authorities.
Documentation updates: The master file, the local file and the 
CbC report should be updated annually, although in many cases infor-
mation (for example, functional analysis or description of business) 
may not change. To the extent that operating conditions are unchanged, 
tax administrations may permit taxpayers to update their database 
searches for comparables in the local file every three years. However, 
financial data for the comparables would be updated annually.
Language: Recognizing the potential cost and burden of provid-
ing documentation in the local language, the Final Report states that 
local law should specify the required language. But Action 13 encour-
ages countries to permit filing of documentation in “commonly 
used languages where it will not compromise the usefulness of the 
 42 Ibid., at 77.
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documents.”  43  To the extent the tax authorities need a translation 
of documents, they can make that request to taxpayers and provide 
adequate time to secure the translation.
Penalties: The Final Report cautions against the imposition of 
documentation-related penalties (civil or criminal) where taxpayers 
do not have access to the information. But it is not a good defence 
to contend that some other related party bears the group responsi-
bility for documentation. The decision not to impose these penalties 
would not prevent a jurisdiction from making the underlying trans-
fer pricing adjustment in order to bring taxpayers into compliance 
with the arm’s length principle. Two strategic observations regarding 
documentation-related penalties may guide the thinking of a country 
about designing a penalty regime:
(a) Differences in penalty regimes among countries may influ-
ence whether a taxpayer “favours” one jurisdiction over 
another in pricing. For example, if one jurisdiction imposes 
stronger penalties (compliance and/or underlying substan-
tive pricing penalties) than another, the taxpayer may be 
more inclined to shift resources (and even transfer pricing 
profits) to the jurisdiction with the stronger penalty regime 
so as to avoid the imposition of large penalties;
(b) A documentation regime that includes benefits for com-
pliant taxpayers may increase the actual compliance of 
a taxpayer with the documentation rules, resulting in a 
favourable outcome for the country. For example, if taxpay-
ers who meet documentation requirements receive some 
measure of penalty protection or a shift in burden on some 
or all issues, there will be added taxpayer incentive for 
upfront conformity with the documentation requirements.
Confidentiality: As the prospect of increased disclosure of infor-
mation becomes more likely, taxpayers are expressing greater concern 
regarding confidentiality. Action 13 urges tax administrations to protect 
taxpayers from public disclosure of trade secrets, scientific secrets and 
other confidential information. The need for protection should lead 
countries to carefully consider their requests for such information and 
 43 Ibid., at 18.
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to provide assurances to the taxpayer regarding confidentiality. To the 
extent that public court proceedings or judicial decisions will entail 
some measure of disclosure, confidentiality should be preserved to the 
extent possible and disclosure should be as limited as possible.
Implementation:
(a) Changes to domestic law: Tax law, including transfer pric-
ing rules, are a function of domestic law. Thus, in order to 
achieve the benefits of increased uniformity under Action 13 
(as well as the widespread adoption of best practices advo-
cated by the Final Report), countries need to make changes 
to their own domestic law. Thus, for example, countries 
need to enact transfer pricing and documentation rules that 
require their locally based MNE affiliates to produce infor-
mation required for the master file, CbC template and local 
file (as detailed in the three annexes attached to the Final 
Report). Given the general importance of consistency, and 
the need for master file information to be consistent across 
jurisdictions, countries should review their own domestic 
rules. The goal would be domestic rules that require pro-
duction of information for the master file that conforms to 
the annexes contained in the Final Report (detailing the 
information in both the master file and the CbC reporting 
template). In terms of timing, Action 13 recommends that 
MNEs (with annual consolidated group revenue equal to or 
exceeding €750 million) be required to file their first CbC 
report for fiscal years beginning on or after 1 January 2016, 
although the Final Report acknowledges that some jurisdic-
tions may need additional time to follow their domestic law 
procedures for implementing new rules. To facilitate timely 
introduction of these new reporting requirements, the 
annex contained in the Final Report includes model legisla-
tion for requiring the MNE parent to file the CbC report in 
its residence jurisdiction. This model could be modified by 
individual jurisdictions to meet their specific needs.
(b) Delivery mechanism: The Final Report recommends that the 
MNE parent make the master file and the local file avail-
able to the local affiliates, who will then share it with their 
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local taxing authorities (“the master file and local file [will] 
be filed directly with the tax administrations in each rel-
evant jurisdiction as required by those administrations”). 44  
The CbC reports, however, would be filed with the resi-
dence jurisdiction of the MNE parent. Then, the MNE 
parent jurisdiction would share the CbC report with the 
jurisdictions of the local affiliates through a treaty infor-
mation exchange mechanism. The Final Report includes 
three model competent authority agreements (CAAs) to be 
used to facilitate exchange of CbC reports. The models are 
based on exchange under: (a) the Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; (b) bilateral 
tax conventions; and (c) tax information exchange agree-
ments (TIEAs). Although three models are provided, ide-
ally the mechanism would be a CAA under the Multilateral 
Convention. That is, parties to the Convention could sign 
the CAA under the Convention and achieve widespread 
automatic exchange in a more streamlined manner. In 
accordance with this CAA, each signatory would exchange 
any CbC reports it received from MNEs headquartered in 
its jurisdiction with other signatories satisfying the terms 
of the CAA (including confidentiality). As at 26 January 
2017, 57 jurisdictions have signed the CAA for automatic 
exchange of CbC reports under the Multilateral Convention.
 Under what are expected to be limited circumstances, a sec-
ondary mechanism for obtaining the CbC report, including 
local filing, may be possible as a backup.
 Given that access to this new reporting format and infor-
mation is at the heart of Action 13, many countries have 
strongly advocated that the delivery mechanism should be 
uncomplicated and widely available (see section 3.3.6.2.2 
 44 Ibid., at 20. This direct filing has raised some concerns regarding tax-
payer protection. See Ryan Finley, “Lawmakers Urge Limiting Exchange of 
CbC Reports,” (2016) Vol. 81, Tax Notes International, 751. (The Vice President 
of Tax and Domestic Economic Policy at the National Association of Manu-
facturers noted she was particularly troubled by the direct filing of the master 
report with local tax authorities because it would not be protected by the 
Treasury’s safeguards that are in place for the exchange of the CbC reports.)
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below). Taxpayers, however, have repeated their concerns 
that the delivery mechanism should include appropriate 
safeguards ensuring the protection of their information.
3.3.5 General questions regarding Action 13 recommendations
3.3.5.1 Taxpayer burden
The Action 13 recommendations (see section 3.3.3 above) have sought 
to reflect the concerns raised by multinational taxpayers and their 
advisers. Primarily, these concerns centre on an overarching theme 
that compliance with documentation is much more difficult than 
the OECD and governments understand. Taxpayers had enumerated 
a variety of challenges and barriers to their immediate, low-burden 
compliance with the master file, CbC template and local file require-
ments. These difficulties included: existing reporting systems not 
aligned to the requested information; different reporting and measure-
ment approaches within different parts of a multinational and across 
multinationals; difficulty in securing the information in a timely fash-
ion; the need to rework data from affiliates into a consistent reporting 
format; the cost of gathering requested data; the burden arising from 
uncertainty in definitions and applications (for example, what counts 
as an employee). Not surprisingly, given the objections articulated, 
taxpayers raised the most questions about the CbC template.
Despite this general critique, taxpayer responses to the release of 
the recommendations under Action 13 seem to vary considerably. MNEs 
have pursued one or more of the following steps: (a) reported that their 
operations are significantly out of step with the data sought; (b) used the 
OECD comment period (after release of the Discussion Draft) to press 
for modifications; (c) tested their ability to comply with the master file, 
CbC template and local file structure; and (d) explored new informa-
tion management systems to facilitate their compliance with anticipated 
reporting requirements. As jurisdictions have begun enacting domestic 
legislation regarding the master file, local file and CbC report, taxpayers 
have commenced their own corresponding data collection process. In 
some cases, MNEs may have already been gathering such information 
in order to comply with pre-existing, country-specific reporting require-
ments imposed by jurisdictions which already had required reporting on 
the worldwide activities of their MNEs and certain foreign subsidiaries.
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3.3.5.2 Delivery mechanism
Among the most controversial issues raised by Action 13 is how the 
required information (master file, CbC template, local file) is delivered. 
As noted in 3.3.4 above, the CbC report will be filed with the MNE 
parent’s residence jurisdiction and shared with other countries via a 
treaty exchange mechanism. The master file and local file will be filed 
directly with the local jurisdiction.
Taxpayers had generally urged that required filings be made to 
the country of the MNE parent corporation. The primary argument 
advanced for the single central filing (at least of the master file and 
the CbC template) was the concern that some jurisdictions might not 
adequately protect information. The expectation is that if the data is 
provided only to the parent jurisdiction and then shared via treaty 
request, there will be additional protection because countries request-
ing information pursuant to a treaty must ensure and commit to spec-
ified confidentiality requirements.
The significance of the taxpayer concern about confidentiality 
turns on two points: the legitimacy of the concern over protection of 
taxpayer information, and the sensitive nature of the data. First, appro-
priate protection of taxpayer data is an accepted norm, although there 
are differences in exactly what is protected, when it is protected and 
how. Model exchange of information provisions (for example, Article 
26 of both the United Nations and OECD Model Conventions) make 
reference to the expectations regarding taxpayer privacy, and expound 
further upon the application of the standard in the accompanying 
commentaries. Thus, the decision in the Final Report to share the CbC 
template via treaty mechanisms directly addresses taxpayer concerns 
over data protection. But that same delivery mechanism decision poses 
challenges for requesting jurisdictions, particularly developing coun-
tries (see section 3.3.6 below).
Second, regardless of the broader subject of taxpayer privacy, 
to the extent that information in the master file and the CbC template 
is generally publicly available in the case of many multinationals, the 
argument in favour of filing those documents only with the juris-
diction of the parent—as ultimately concluded in the Final Report—
may be weakened. For example, in the case of publicly traded entities, 
how much of the information is publicly reported in compliance with 
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securities (or other) regulations? Are there other public sources for 
that information? If so, how much weight should have been given 
to arguments about uncertain protection of the data? Alternatively, 
should the public availability of data be less relevant in the debate 
if the “public” information is cumbersome to gather? This argument 
would be grounded on the assumption that difficult-to-assemble data 
is in reality “less public” and thus there would be a real impact on 
these taxpayers if their well-organized reporting to the tax authorities 
were inadvertently made public. Should privately held multinationals 
be treated differently if their publicly available entity information is 
more limited?
The conclusion in the Final Report to specify treaty-based deliv-
ery of the CbC report reflects OECD determination that arguments 
favouring enhanced confidentiality were ultimately more persuasive.
3.3.5.3 Use of information
Related to the delivery mechanism concern (see section 3.3.5.2 above) 
is the separate question of which information a country may access 
and what it may appropriately do with the information. Taxpayers typ-
ically have expressed several concerns about what jurisdictions might 
do with information compiled by taxpayers.
Replace audit: One concern articulated by taxpayers is that 
countries, particularly those that may be resource-constrained, will 
use the master file and the template data as the basis for an actual 
transfer pricing allocation. For example, if such a jurisdiction draws 
the conclusion that inadequate income (and thus tax) is being reported 
in its jurisdiction relative to the value chain, functions and report-
ing of income worldwide, the tax authorities might simply stop at that 
stage and make a transfer pricing adjustment. The OECD has stated 
that the purpose of the master file and the CbC template is to facilitate 
risk assessment and decisions about where to allocate audit resources—
not to replace the audit. The Final Report explicitly states that the 
master file and CbC template are understood to be a high-level view 
and are not expected to displace an audit of the taxpayer. 45 
 45 OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country 
Reporting, Action 13—2015 Final Report, supra note 15, at 22.
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Shift to formulary: In a similar vein, taxpayers are also 
concerned that countries may use this information (master file and 
CbC template) to shift informally to a formulary approach to transfer 
pricing, despite formally being committed to an arm’s length approach. 
In part, countries might be inclined to use the information in this way 
if they find it difficult to locate comparables for the traditional appli-
cation of the arm’s length method. Again, developing countries, in 
particular, may face this challenge (see section 3.3.6 below). Although 
substantive reforms to transfer pricing rules are not part of Action 
13, this taxpayer concern reveals the connections among administra-
tion, documentation and substantive law. However, the work of the 
Platform for Collaboration on Tax (see section 2.2.4.2 above) in devel-
oping a transfer pricing draft toolkit could serve as a brake on any 
inclination to informally shift to formulary, by assisting developing 
countries in identifying useful comparables.
Assist beyond transfer pricing: Should countries use some of 
this high-level information, in particular the CbC template, to assist 
more broadly in efforts to combat base erosion and profit shifting? 
Certainly, Action 11 envisions that the data generated through compli-
ance with Action 13 (including the CbC report) will assist in assessing 
the medium- and longer-term effects of BEPS and BEPS countermeas-
ures. 46  The decisions made in the Final Report regarding the content of 
the CbC template and the specific columns of information will impact 
how countries can effectively use the filings to reach beyond transfer 
pricing concerns to other causes of base erosion.
Format and function: Taxpayers raised a variety of questions 
regarding exactly how to report data properly, especially under the 
CbC template, including how to handle various accounting differences 
within the multinational group, how to define “employees” and how to 
treat PEs. The annex to the Final Report provides “specific instructions” 
on completing each column of the template. 47  The basic content of the 
columns, along with these instructions, likely reflects the intended and 
appropriate uses of the data, and the potential burdens on taxpayers.
 46 OECD, Measuring and Monitoring BEPS, Action 11—2015 Final 
Report, supra note 4, at 202–203, 260.
 47 OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country 
Reporting, Action 13—2015 Final Report, supra note 15, at 33 –35.
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For example, the decision to require reporting of only the number 
of employees and not their compensation likely reflects a conclusion 
that the effort of trying to ascertain what counts as compensation for 
all employees across entities and jurisdictions is not necessary for a 
high-level risk assessment given the burden it might impose. “Number 
of employees” in each jurisdiction might be an adequate and less 
burdensome measure of the MNE presence in a country. Emphasizing 
consistency in reporting across tax years, the instructions provide 
guidance on full-time equivalent reporting of employees, reliance on 
average employment levels and treatment of independent contractors.
The flexibility permitted in sourcing financial data similarly 
reflects the view that a steady comparative picture of the MNE activi-
ties across countries and years is the core of the high-level risk assess-
ment intended by the master file and CbC template. However, the Final 
Report’s flexibility on whether taxpayers report information from the 
bottom up or the top down (see section 3.3.3.2 above) has been viewed 
by some as directly impacting the template’s ability to aid in provid-
ing even a high-level risk assessment. From this viewpoint, bottom-up 
reporting effectively replicates (and obscures) any BEPS already in 
place and thus fails to signal the real risk to the tax authorities; only 
top-down reporting reveals even the high-level risk of BEPS problems 
for the jurisdiction.
3.3.5.4 Data protection and authorized public disclosure
In addition to the concern expressed by countries regarding how the 
master file and template will be reported and shared (see section 3.3.5.2 
above) is a general focus on data protection and a special focus on the 
potential for authorized public disclosure. On a broad level, taxpay-
ers fear that some jurisdictions will not follow agreed and accepted 
standards for data protection, either because of inadequate internal 
rules and oversight mechanisms or because of a more intentional deci-
sion to share information with other agencies or domestic competitors. 
As discussed in section 3.3.5.2 above, the decision in the Final Report 
that MNEs file the CbC report only with the parent jurisdiction, who 
shares it only with countries committed to data protection consist-
ent with the model treaties, provides a measure of certainty regard-
ing data protection. Suggestions for further enhancing confidentiality 
have included a mechanism for reviewing country compliance with 
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confidentiality protocols, a reporting system for taxpayers experienc-
ing confidentiality problems and possible penalties for jurisdictions 
that fail to appropriately protect taxpayer data.
A country’s compliance with the confidentiality standards 
of Action 13 will be assessed as part of a peer review process under 
the auspices of a new OECD-based group. In February 2016, follow-
ing the October 2015 release of the BEPS Final Reports, the OECD 
announced a “new framework” for country participation in the 
continuing BEPS work and in the updating of international tax rules: 
the Inclusive Framework. 48  The goal of the Inclusive Framework is to 
enable all interested jurisdictions to “participate as BEPS Associates 
in an extension of the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA).”  49  
Participation in the Inclusive Framework, however, requires that the 
BEPS Associates commit to implementing the four minimum stand-
ards from the final BEPS Project recommendations: (a) tackling harm-
ful tax practices; (b) confronting treaty shopping; (c) implementing 
CbC reporting; and (d) improving dispute resolution. 50  This commit-
ment will be tested through a peer review process. In February 2017, 
the OECD released a document containing “key documents” to be 
used in the peer review of Inclusive Framework members regarding 
their commitment to CbC reporting: (a) terms of reference; (b) meth-
odology for the conduct of peer reviews; and (c) detailed outline of 
the phases of the review. 51  Compliance with confidentiality standards 
plays a prominent role in this review. 52 
 48 OECD, “All Interested Countries and Jurisdictions to Be Invited to 
Join Global Efforts Led by the OECD and G20 to Close International Tax 
Loopholes,” (23 February 2016), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/all-
interested-countries-and-jurisdictions-to-be-invited-to-join-global-efforts-
led-by-the-oecd-and-g20-to-close-international-tax-loopholes.htm.
 49 Ibid. See also OECD, “Background Brief: Inclusive Framework for 
BEPS Implementation” (January 2017), at 5, (specifying how jurisdictions 
would participate on an equal footing), available at https://www.oecd.org/
tax/background-brief-inclusive-framework-for-beps-implementation.pdf.
 50 Ibid., at 13.
 51 OECD, BEPS Action 13 on Country-by-Country Reporting: Peer Review 
Documents, supra note 8.
 52 The three major elements of compliance with Action 13 to be explored 
in the review process are: (a) the domestic legal and administrative frame-
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In the context of BEPS, data protection has an additional dimen-
sion beyond the above-discussed concern that countries might either: 
(a) carelessly allow unauthorized access to private commercial or tax 
information; or (b) intentionally share information with State-owned 
competitors or with favoured domestic competitors. Specifically, 
taxpayers also worry that reporting to governments under Action 13 
will serve as a prelude to authorized public disclosure of certain tax 
information. Not only have there been explicit demands for public 
disclosure of some Action 13 material (particularly the CbC template), 
but a disclosure trend can be observed in recent public disclo-
sure projects, including new United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission reporting rules and other similar projects in extractive 
and financial industry sectors (see section 4.4 below). The increased 
public awareness of the role and conduct of multinationals in the econ-
omy and the import of BEPS issues has led to calls for public disclosure 
of some, or all, of the information that would be provided by businesses 
to tax authorities under the BEPS initiatives. 53  From a perspective that 
citizens should be able to assess and evaluate the conduct of their own 
government with MNEs, and should be able to ensure that the country 
and the treasury are properly protected, public release of some or all of 
the master file and template data would likely be sought. Public release 
of basic tax information could serve as a check on corruption, inade-
quate enforcement and/or inadequate substantive tax rules.
Following the release of the 2014 BEPS Deliverables, includ-
ing on Action 13, the BEPS Monitoring Group issued a review of the 
progress on the BEPS action items to date. With regard to the question 
of disclosure of Action 13 to the public, the group concluded:
work; (b) the exchange of information network; and (c) confidentiality and 
use of CbC reports. Ibid., at 12.
 53 See, for example, C20, “Position Paper Background: Governance,” 
supra note 10, at 5 (advocating a “commitment to make public country-by-
country reporting the global standard” assuming that “[e]nsuring this infor-
mation is made public would enable tax administrators in the poorest coun-
tries to easily access this information and address base erosion and profit 
shifting”). See also, Andrew Goodall, “U.K. Ministers Reject MPs’ Call to 
Action on Transparency,” Worldwide Tax Daily (23 January 2017) (discussing 
new United Kingdom power to require public disclosure).
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In view of the very general nature of the information required 
by the CbC report template, there seems no valid reason why 
these reports should not be published. The [BEPS] report rightly 
stresses the need for tax authorities to preserve strict confiden-
tiality of information which may be commercially confidential. 
However, the CbC report as now designed would not normally 
include such information. Publication should therefore be the 
norm, subject perhaps to allowance for exceptional cases. There 
is widespread public interest in such greater corporate trans-
parency, which has led to mandatory publication requirements 
especially in the EU and the US of such reports in specific 
sectors (extractive industries and financial services). Finally, 
this data would constitute an invaluable information resource, 
which should be treated as public domain. At present, corporate 
data, even if they originate from state legal requirements e.g. 
for publication of company accounts, are in practice extremely 
difficult to access. Hence, both researchers and even govern-
ment bodies such as tax authorities, are dependent on private 
providers of data-bases. This is particularly damaging to devel-
oping countries, both because of the high cost of subscriptions, 
and because the coverage of developing countries in such data-
bases is poor. The G20 should take a lead in making this impor-
tant standard a worldwide expectation, and ensure that the data 
is publicly available to support corporate transparency and 
facilitate tax enforcement everywhere in the world. 54 
Other organizations have similarly urged increased public 
reporting. 55  For example, Christian Aid, in commenting on the 
January 2014 OECD Discussion Draft for Action 13, stated that it is 
“firmly of the belief that the Country by Country (CbC) report be made 
public,” citing the opportunity to hold both governments and multina-
tionals more accountable on the basis of such tax information. 56  The 
 54 BEPS Monitoring Group, OECD BEPS Scorecard (7 October 2014), 
available at https://bepsmonitoringgroup.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/oecd-
beps-scorecard.pdf.
 55 Ryan Finley, “NGOs Urge Treasury, IRS, to Make CbC Reports Public,” 
(2016) Vol. 82, Tax Notes International, 765.
 56 Christian Aid Submission, OECD BEPS project: Discussion draft on 
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Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD (TUAC) similarly 
supported public disclosure of certain MNE taxpayer information in 
order to facilitate informed public discussion. 57 
The government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland was granted domestic statutory power in 2016 to 
require multinationals to publicly report their CbC profits and taxes. 
Now the debate in the United Kingdom concerns whether, when 
and how it should exercise this new power. The United Kingdom 
Department for International Development maintains that the OECD 
is the best and most appropriate place to pursue such discussions and 
action. 58  On a more regional level, the European Union (EU) Council 
Transfer Pricing Documentation and CbC Reporting (February 2014), avail-
able at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/volume1.pdf.
 57 See Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC), OECD Public Con-
sultation on Draft Revised Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation 
and Country-by-Country Reporting: Comments by the TUAC (21 February 
2014), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/volume4.pdf. 
It states that “[p]ublic disclosure would resolve a number of outstanding 
issues, including the above mentioned problem of access to information for 
developing countries. It would also help inform other stakeholders, who are 
affected by the activities and operations of MNEs, including workers, local 
communities, civil society groups and of course citizens at large. The content 
of the public filing could cover a selected number of reporting items which in 
our view would not threaten or violate business confidentiality rights. Items 
could include: (i) organisational structure, (ii) important drivers of busi-
ness profit, (iii) supply chain for material products and services, (iv) service 
arrangements between members of the MNE group, (v) business restructur-
ing transactions during the fiscal year, (vi) geographic distribution of the 
top 5/10% highest compensated employees, (vii) geographic distribution of 
employees and other supervised workers expressed in number of full-time 
employments, and (viii) MNE’s important financing arrangements with 
unrelated lenders. . . . Regarding reporting on tax and incomes, reporting 
should include (i) consolidated group accounts and (ii) tax due and tax paid 
in each country. The public filing should at least include reporting on a single 
ratio between tax charge and declared profits to give some indication on the 
potential presence of risk for transfer pricing manipulation and other aggres-
sive tax planning schemes.”
 58 Andrew Goodall, “UK Ministers Reject MPs’ Call to Action on Trans-
parency,” supra note 53 (noting the debate within the United Kingdom 
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has been reviewing a proposal to require MNEs to publicly disclose 
their income taxes paid and certain other information. 59  But in 
December 2016, the French Constitutional Council ruled that public 
CbC reporting is not constitutional. 60 
Business organizations continue to strongly urge careful protec-
tion of taxpayer data and reject the idea that public disclosure of some of 
the Action 13 information (such as the CbC report) could be an appro-
priate response. The Business and Industry Advisory Committee to 
the OECD (BIAC) contended that the master file and the CbC report 
“should only be provided by taxpayers to their home (headquarter) tax 
administrations, to then be shared through existing exchange of infor-
mation channels with the necessary confidentiality requirements.”  61  
Rather than contemplate some form of limited public disclosure, BIAC 
sought enhanced measures to safeguard taxpayer information (including 
“anti-infringement procedures” to protect taxpayers from unauthorized 
disclosure, the viewing of certain information only at the taxpayer site, 
and legally binding confidentiality agreements between taxpayers and tax 
administrations). 62  The International Alliance for Principled Taxation 
similarly recommended that “the CbC report be filed with the parent 
company’s home country tax authority as the Discussion Draft contem-
plates, but that it then be shared with other tax authorities only through 
a formal EOI channel (whether spontaneously or upon request), so that 
confidentiality obligations will apply to the recipient governments.”  63  
regarding whether and how the government should exercise its new (2016) 
statutory power to require multinationals to publish CbC reports of their 
profits and taxes).
 59 EU Council, “EU Council Reviews Status of Income Tax Information 
Disclosure Proposal,” Worldwide Tax Daily (19 December 2016).
 60 Alexander Lewis, “French Constitutional Council Finds Public CbC 
Reporting Unconstitutional,” Worldwide Tax Daily (12 December 2016).
 61 OECD Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC), “OECD 
Discussion Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country by Country 
Reporting” (21 February 2014), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-
pricing/volume1.pdf.
 62 Ibid.
 63 International Alliance for Principled Taxation, Comments on Discus-
sion Draft on Transfer Pricing Documentation and CbC Reporting (23 Febru-
ary 2014), available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/volume2.pdf.
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In addition to the concerns about the public disclosure of trade secrets 
and related information, multinationals and their representatives have 
expressed concern that public disclosure of tax information could easily 
be misinterpreted and used (inappropriately) for political purposes.
The OECD has repeatedly asserted that the Action 13 informa-
tion is intended only for governments and only for the purposes of 
making risk assessments for BEPS. The Final Report reiterates that 
“[t]ax administrations should take all reasonable steps to ensure that 
there is no public disclosure of confidential information.”  64  Given 
the importance of this issue (access and use of information) and the 
widely differing views on what information should be made availa-
ble to whom, and on what terms, implementation of Action 13 will 
continue to generate significant debate.
3.3.5.5 Independent country action
One important thread paralleling the entire BEPS process is the dis-
tinct possibility that countries may pursue unilateral responses to their 
BEPS problems. Such action could be in advance of broad agreement 
on BEPS steps or contemporaneous with it. Additionally, as noted in 
section 3.3.5.1 above, some countries already impose fairly extensive 
reporting obligations on their own multinationals, as well as on other 
entities doing business in their jurisdiction. The risk or possibility of 
independent unilateral action by countries on BEPS problems is rel-
evant throughout the debates on specific BEPS recommendations. For 
example, in measuring and evaluating the burden imposed on taxpay-
ers by the requirements under the master file, CbC template and local 
file, it is fair to consider the reduction in burden that corporations may 
experience through such a unified and streamlined reporting system. 
Similarly, taxpayers themselves may reassess their resistance to the 
OECD project on BEPS given the risk of multiple, country-specific 
reporting requirements that might arise should the project not con-
tinue to move forward with some success. Such individual country 
requirements seem all the more possible given that countries could 
use the Action 13 master file and CbC template as a baseline in crafting 
 64 OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country 
Reporting, Action 13—2015 Final Report, supra note 15, at 19.
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their own reporting legislation. 65  This “risk” of independent action 
by countries may be greatest with respect to those jurisdictions that 
have some leverage in the market. In contrast, a developing country 
that perceives itself as having more limited negotiating power vis-à-vis 
multinationals may be less inclined to impose independent reporting 
requirements perceived as “unfriendly” to business. Effectively, coun-
tries could be competing based on their relative lack of disclosure. 
Those developing countries might find it advantageous if a uniform 
standard of public reporting is broadly adopted (along the lines of 
BEPS Action 13), if it is adopted at all.
3.3.6 Developing country issues regarding Action 13
Although all countries share many of the same concerns, questions 
and goals regarding reporting under Action 13, developing countries 
may have a distinct perspective. In terms of both the overall mission of 
Action 13 and the implementation-specific decisions, developing coun-
tries should evaluate the BEPS project against their own circumstances.
3.3.6.1 Overall perspective
The broad mission of Action 13, to improve a country’s risk assessments 
for BEPS (through the master file and CbC template) and to facilitate 
transfer pricing audits (through the local file), is likely important to 
developing countries with limited audit and other resources. First, to 
the extent that developing countries must decide where to direct their 
most sophisticated audit resources, they would want to identify their 
most serious BEPS problems. A high-level assessment tool (master file 
and CbC template) for each MNE operating in the jurisdiction would 
provide the country with a solid basis for making that preliminary risk 
assessment and assigning audit resources.
Second, assuming the form and content of the information 
package (the master file, CbC template and local file) becomes stand-
ard for MNEs, developing countries can rely on a unified format as 
they make both high-level risk assessment decisions and as they eval-
uate taxpayer-specific transactions among related entities. Both their 
 65 See section 3.3.5.4 above for examples regarding the efforts in the 
United Kingdom, France and the EU to require public CbC reporting.
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own MNEs, as well as foreign multinationals conducting business in 
their jurisdiction, will be utilizing the same format and standards, 
thereby producing more uniform information that may be more readily 
subject to comparison. Again, for a jurisdiction with limited resources, 
this enhanced uniformity in reporting (assuming it carries the requi-
site content) should allow the tax administration to process and evalu-
ate the information more effectively—and train new tax professionals.
Third, a global commitment to Action 13 recommendations 
should benefit developing countries. If many countries, including 
countries with more enforcement resources, are seeking the informa-
tion, presumably taxpayers will more readily comply. Moreover, this 
compliance would likely be not only in name (for example, provid-
ing documents labelled “master file” and “template”) but also in spirit 
(providing materials meeting the expectations articulated for each of 
these documents). Thus, use of the BEPS process to enhance infor-
mation reporting and document production by MNEs offers certain 
advantages for resource-constrained jurisdictions.
3.3.6.2 Implementation-specific perspective
Although the driving purpose behind Action 13 would be compat-
ible with and would help facilitate most developing country audit and 
enforcement goals, the details regarding the actual implementation of 
Action 13 are critical to their real-world impact. Both the content of the 
reporting (the master file, the CbC template and the local file) and the 
manner in which this information is provided to countries will ulti-
mately determine whether the potential value of Action 13 is realized.
3.3.6.2.1 Content
Several of the design questions that have arisen in the context of craft-
ing the master file, CbC template and local file may be particularly 
relevant for developing countries.
Reporting entities: First, given that developing countries may 
find they have many permanent establishments (PEs) operating in their 
jurisdiction, the clarifications in the Final Report regarding the opera-
tions for which reporting is required should prove valuable. The annex 
contained in the Final Report confirms that a “Constituent Entity” of 
the MNE group which must be included in the reporting is: (a) any 
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separate business unit of the MNE group included in the Consolidated 
Financial Statements (or that would be included if publicly traded); 
(b) any business unit excluded from the MNE group’s Consolidated 
Financial Statements solely on size or materiality; (c) any PE of any 
separate business unit of the MNE group included in (a) or (b) if the 
unit prepares separate financial statements for financial reporting, 
regulatory, tax reporting or internal management control purposes. 66 
Accounting: Second, as initially noted in sections 3.3.3.2 and 
3.3.5.3 above, countries in general, but developing countries especially, 
might prefer the top-down allocation of group income to the extent that 
they are concerned that use of the local statutory accounts to construct 
a bottom-up reporting may disguise underlying BEPS problems. If the 
local statutory accounts reflect inappropriate pricing and profit shift-
ing, that reality might be built into the template responses and effec-
tively obscure the base erosion and profit shifting. This concern is not 
unique to developing countries. As noted in 3.3.5.3 above, the Final 
Report allows either approach so long as it is applied consistently by 
the MNE. However, the choice of the MNE, and the resulting template, 
may play a more pivotal role in the tax enforcement process of a devel-
oping country if it lacks other reporting mechanisms or information 
that could signal a risk for BEPS with regard to a particular taxpayer.
Verification: Third, although attention has been given to the 
source of data used in constructing the files, less attention has been 
focused on verification of the information. Of course, verification of 
data is always an issue for tax authorities. If there are expectations 
regarding the ability of a country to verify information, it would be 
useful to outline them more specifically; the Final Report has not 
addressed this issue. This concern may be most prominent in the local 
file context because that information would likely be circulated to a 
more limited pool of tax authorities. In contrast, the master file and 
CbC template would likely receive wider circulation. It is not clear, 
however, whether a jurisdiction that finds the master file or template 
inaccurate would be expected to unilaterally share that information 
with other countries in possession of the file or template.
 66 OECD, Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country 
Reporting, Action 13—Final Report, supra note 15, at 31.
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Language: Fourth, the Final Report does not specify a report-
ing language and leaves that decision to local law. However, coun-
tries are “encouraged” to allow taxpayers to file their documentation 
in “commonly used languages.”  67  Certainly, in many cases it is likely 
to be more efficient for the developing country that the master file 
be in English rather than the language of the MNE parent jurisdic-
tion (assuming that language is not English). However, the personnel 
constraints that developing country tax administrations face include 
the limited pool of English-speaking tax professionals with sufficient 
international tax training to effectively review the files, make risk 
assessments and then pursue taxpayer audits where appropriate. If 
more information is made available in the language of the developing 
country, the number of tax professionals in government available to 
work on audits, reviews and examinations may increase.
Burden: Fifth, the dominant taxpayer critique of Action 13 
reporting (master file, CbC template and local file) has been that of the 
burden it imposes on taxpayers (see section 3.3.5.1 above). Although 
the question of burden is important, and requested information should 
be useful and reasonable in context, the balance of benefit and burden 
may look different from a developing country perspective. Taxpayers 
have urged that they not be asked to provide difficult-to-gather data 
that a country would be unable to use. This objection is not levelled 
solely at developing countries, but it is one that is heightened where a 
country has limited resources and is ultimately constrained in its abil-
ity to process information meaningfully. However, despite this claim, 
which might suggest that the benefits to developing countries would 
be less than the burden to the taxpayer, a broader look at the benefits 
and burden question might produce a different conclusion. Developing 
countries are often understood to be highly dependent upon income 
taxes, specifically corporate income taxes, for their revenue base. There 
are a number of factors contributing to this fiscal picture and although 
it may shift in the long term, at present there is a serious cost to the fiscal 
welfare and stability of these countries when they are unable to collect 
corporate income tax otherwise due. Additionally, developing coun-
tries have fewer internal resources to engage in extensive monitoring 
and reviewing of multinational taxpayers and their tax planning. Thus, 
 67 Ibid., at 18.
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the benefit to these jurisdictions in having MNEs provide relatively 
uniform, comprehensive information of both a qualitative and quan-
titative nature that assists in risk assessment and in audit is distinctly 
valuable. That said, the BEPS project is a group effort by countries to 
respond to BEPS. However, in making a group-wide assessment of the 
burden imposed on taxpayers by Action 13 compared to the bene-
fit for tax administrations, it will be important to bear in mind that 
the benefit should not be measured solely from a developed country 
perspective. 68 
3.3.6.2.2 Delivery
Just as the question of to whom (and how) information will be pro-
vided is very significant for taxpayers, it is equally critical for develop-
ing countries. As suggested in section 3.3.6.1 above, Action 13 will play 
little meaningful role if countries cannot predictably and effectively 
access the information in the master file, CbC template and local file. 
Given that many of the key advantages of this information package for 
developing countries derive from the resource-savings opportunities it 
provides (see section 3.3.6.1 above), it is important that countries have 
easy access to the information in a timely fashion. To the extent that 
 68 Various international groups have urged that the OECD project on 
BEPS appropriately incorporate the views and needs of developing countries. 
See, for example, C20, “Position Paper Background: Governance,” supra 
note 10, at 2 (recommending “an inclusive and transparent process that 
ensures developing countries benefit from these tax reforms”); G20 Lead-
ers’ Declaration (St. Petersburg, 6 September 2013), at 13 (“Developing coun-
tries should be able to reap the benefits of a more transparent international 
tax system, and to enhance their revenue capacity, as mobilizing domestic 
resources is critical to financing development”), available at https://g20.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Saint_Petersburg_Declaration_ENG_0.
pdf; G20 Leaders’ Communiqué (Brisbane, 16 November 2014), at 2 (“We 
welcome deeper engagement of developing countries in the BEPS project to 
address their concerns. We will work with them to build their tax adminis-
tration capacity and implement AEOI.”), available at https://www.g20.org/
Content/DE/_Anlagen/G7_G20/2014-g20-abschlusserklaerung-eng.pdf?__
blob=publicationFile&v=3. It was in part in response to these critiques that 
the OECD introduced its Inclusive Framework in February 2016, discussed 
above in 3.3.5.4. The Inclusive Framework commits to providing all members 
with the opportunity to participate on an equal footing.
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the delivery mechanism imposes costs, the value of the entire process 
for developing countries is diminished.
For example, given that the CbC report is provided only to the 
jurisdiction of the MNE parent, with the expectation that other coun-
tries will secure that information through an automatic exchange of 
information, several barriers are created. First, the developing country 
must be a signatory to a relevant treaty (Multilateral Convention, bilat-
eral treaty or TIEA). Given that developing countries typically have 
more limited treaty networks and more limited capacity to expand their 
networks, straightforward access to the CbC report may be problem-
atic for some countries. Second, even if the developing country is a 
signatory to one of the three categories of treaties, there must also be 
a competent authority agreement (CAA) in place providing for auto-
matic exchange. Particularly in cases where a developing country has 
only a TIEA, or perhaps a bilateral treaty, it may take time to get the 
treaty partner to execute the necessary CAA (this practical limitation 
was the motivation in the Final Report for advocating for a multilateral 
CAA under the Multilateral Convention). In the absence of the CAA for 
automatic exchange, the developing country could pursue the process of 
requesting the information. This step requires the efforts of a tax profes-
sional sufficiently familiar with the process, the rules and possibly a 
foreign language. Moreover, it is not clear what information the request-
ing jurisdiction would have to provide to make this request. One of the 
long-standing problems with treaty-based exchange of information 
provisions has been the requirement imposed on requesting jurisdic-
tions to provide upfront details regarding the underlying taxpayer and 
the matter being investigated. This requirement would contradict one of 
the core tenets of Action 13—allowing countries to make more mean-
ingful BEPS risk assessment early in the process. Yet depending upon 
the precise treaty mechanism under which the country is making the 
request for information, it might need to know much more information 
in order to request the master file and template. Not only would this be 
difficult to accomplish in some cases, it will inevitably require more audit 
resources simply to secure the information intended to provide the risk 
assessment tools. Developing countries will be able to take these steps 
for fewer taxpayers, thus decreasing the beneficial impact of Action 13.
Third, tax administrations generally are seeking to make the 
audit process more contemporaneous. Working through an on-request 
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treaty mechanism to obtain the master CbC report, particularly if the 
requesting country must provide detailed supporting information, 
would only extend the audit process.
Fourth, developing countries are less likely to have MNEs with 
the parent located in their jurisdiction. As a result, a much larger 
portion of their enforcement work to combat BEPS would require the 
preliminary step of obtaining CbC reports from other countries. In 
contrast, developed countries typically have more multinationals head-
quartered in their jurisdictions and would (under a system of filing 
only in the parent country) have the information immediately availa-
ble. Moreover, these developed countries would likely be particularly, 
though not exclusively, interested in BEPS on the part of their own 
major multinationals. Thus, although all countries would (under this 
approach) be required to seek information via treaty (including auto-
matic exchange), the burden would be most significant for developing 
countries which are resource-constrained, dependent upon corporate 
income taxes and have few domestic multinationals.
3.3.6.2.3 Domestic
Commitment to implementation of Action 13 raises several questions for 
countries from a domestic perspective. As with some of the observations 
above, these points may not apply uniquely to developing countries, but 
they may resonate strongly with them. First, domestic legislation would 
be required to fully implement the recommendations. To the extent that 
countries have not yet implemented significant reporting requirements 
for MNEs, they would likely need to do so now. Given the importance of 
obtaining the information, developing countries would want to ensure 
their ability to enact the required legislation.
Second, taxpayers have expressed the concern that countries, 
especially developing countries, may be inclined to bypass a real audit, 
and use the master file and CbC template to impose a transfer pricing 
adjustment based on a more formulary approach (see 3.3.5.3). Some 
taxpayers have urged that the OECD secure commitments from coun-
tries affirming that they will not forgo the arm’s length method, even 
informally. It is unclear what such a commitment would look like. 
However, the peer review for the Inclusive Framework will include 
examination of whether a jurisdiction is using the CbC reports appro-
priately to ensure that it is not employing them as conclusive evidence 
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for an adjustment or as the basis of a formulary adjustment. Given this 
attention to the issue, it makes sense for jurisdictions, including devel-
oping countries, to review their own positions and commitments on 
the subject.
Third, taxpayers have also repeatedly raised confidentiality as 
an objection to widespread filing of the master file and CbC template. 
Regardless of the delivery mechanism(s), countries receiving access to 
information are expected to comply with standards of confidential-
ity and privacy regarding taxpayer information. If the current domes-
tic law of a country is not consistent with the typical expectations 
reflected in, for example, the Multilateral Convention and Article 26 
of either the United Nations or OECD Model Convention, the country 
may wish to pre-emptively evaluate the changes that would be neces-
sary to domestic law for compliance.
Fourth, Action 13 itself does not impose documentation or 
transfer pricing penalties. That remains the province of the individ-
ual countries. The Final Report recommends against documentation 
penalties in cases where the taxpayer does not have access to the data. 
But the Final Report anticipates the need for both documentation and 
mispricing penalties in some cases. As countries examine their own 
documentation and substantive pricing penalties, it is important to 
bear in mind the risk that taxpayers will “favour” jurisdictions with 
more severe penalties: taxpayers might devote more resources to docu-
mentation compliance in such jurisdictions and, where in doubt on 
pricing, shift profits to the jurisdiction with higher penalties (to avoid 
the imposition of such penalties). Given that developed countries 
frequently have well-established transfer pricing documentation and 
substantive penalties regimes, developing countries should carefully 
evaluate their own penalty regimes with these observations in mind.
3.3.6.3 Options
Assuming that developing countries secure workable access to the 
CbC template, there remains the question of how they can best use this 
information. Given the resource constraints faced by many develop-
ing countries, targeted capacity-building might enhance the ability of 
these countries to use the information received from all three formats 
(master file, CbC template and local file) in a strategic manner. For 
example, training for developing country tax auditors could focus on 
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the information included in these files and how to use that information 
to make overall risk assessments and, where appropriate, to pursue 
taxpayer-level audits. Using “case studies” of hypothetical taxpayers 
with corresponding master files, CbC templates and local files would 
help developing countries not only receive the information but begin 
to use it effectively and more immediately to tackle base erosion and 
profit shifting. 69  Real-time technical assistance and capacity-building 
could also be pursued through the “Tax Inspectors Without Borders” 
programme, 70  which provides expertise to developing-country tax 
administrations during the course of real-time audit and enforce-
ment. 71  The G20 has noted its support for this programme. 72 
3.3.7 Summary of Action 13
Action 13 in the OECD Action Plan on BEPS addresses the challenge of 
transfer pricing documentation and the need to understand the activi-
ties of an MNE across the globe. The action item introduces three new 
reporting mechanisms: (a) the master file (standardized information 
for the entire MNE group regarding business activities, finance, debt 
structure, taxation and allocation of income); (b) the CbC reporting 
 69 See, for example, African Tax Administration Forum, A Practical 
Guide on Information Exchange for Developing Countries (2013), at 46 – 47 
(outlining an abbreviated version of the case study concept in the context of 
requesting information).
 70 See generally, OECD website at http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxin-
spectors.htm.
 71 OECD Task Force on Tax and Development, Final Report on the Feasi-
bility Study into the Tax Inspectors Without Borders Initiative (5 June 2013), at 1 
(“Experts would be deployed to work directly with local tax officials on current 
audits and audit-related issues concerning international tax matters, and to 
share general audit practices. In addition to improvements in the quality and 
consistency of audits and the transfer of knowledge to recipient administrations 
(tax administrations seeking assistance), broader benefits are also anticipated 
including the potential for more revenues, greater certainty for taxpayers and 
encouraging a culture of compliance through more effective enforcement”), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/TIWB_feasibility_study.pdf.
 72 G20 Leaders’ Declaration, supra note 68, at 13 (“we welcome the OECD 
Tax Inspectors without Borders initiative, which aims to share knowledge 
and increase domestic capacities in developing countries in the tax area”).
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template (a template completed by each multinational providing data 
on a country-by-country basis on seven key questions); and (c) the 
local file (jurisdiction-specific information on the local entities, their 
financial accounts, financial data of comparables for transfer pricing 
analysis and detailed information on related-party transactions).
The goal of this reporting is to assist countries in: (a) risk assess-
ment; (b) enforcement of transfer pricing requirements; and (c) audit. 
The reporting under Action 13 has raised a number of implementa-
tion issues: (a) burden on the taxpayer; (b) timing of the provision of 
information; (c) scaling of documentation requirements to reflect the 
materiality of the taxpayer and the transactions (based on the size 
and nature of the local economy, and the size and nature of the MNE 
and its activities both globally and locally); (d) expectations regard-
ing document retention and updates; (e) language requirements for 
reporting; (f) nature and impact of documentation penalties; (g) 
confidentiality; and (h) actual implementation (domestic law changes, 
oversight of taxpayer reporting, mechanism(s) for delivering informa-
tion— centralized to MNE parent, locally or other options). Among 
some of the most important concerns that have emerged regarding the 
design and implementation challenges are: (a) burden: the gap between 
how MNEs manage their group reporting and the expectations under 
Action 13; (b) delivery mechanism: the need to ensure taxpayer confi-
dentiality while also ensuring meaningful access to reported infor-
mation, especially by developing countries; (c) use of information: the 
expectation that the CbC template will not lead countries to bypass 
audit and directly impose a transfer pricing adjustment, and the 
expectation that countries will not abandon an arm’s length approach.
Developing countries may want to devote particular attention 
to the following key issues in Action 13: (a) the broad goal of Action 
13 (to improve information necessary for tax authorities to make valid 
risk assessments) may be especially valuable to resource-constrained 
developing countries which must decide where and how to allocate 
scarce audit resources; (b) similarly, as the Action 13 reporting pack-
age (master file, CbC template and local file) becomes the MNE stand-
ard, the increased reporting uniformity should also help developing 
countries conserve and best direct their tax and audit resources; (c) the 
choice of reporting language can also directly impact the ability of 
developing countries to access information; thus, reporting at least the 
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local file in the local language may be very important; (d) the actual 
availability of CbC data will be diminished for developing countries 
that have a smaller treaty network, or have few CAAs for automatic 
exchange under a treaty and must rely on limited tax enforcement staff 
to make the treaty-based inquiries for all information sought; (e) the 
ability to ensure confidentiality under domestic law will be vital and 
will be the subject of peer review; and (f) the capacity-building support 
that would benefit developing countries in making the most of infor-
mation available under the Action 13 reporting package.
3 .4 Disclosure of aggressive tax planning: BEPS Action 12
Action 13 is not the only part of the OECD project on BEPS seeking 
increased information from taxpayers. Action 12 targets aggressive 
tax planning arrangements and seeks taxpayer disclosure regarding 
these structures. The Final Report for Action 12 was also issued on 5 
October 2015. 73 
3.4.1 Goals of Action 12
Based on the view that countries can more effectively tackle base 
erosion and profit shifting if they receive timely and relevant infor-
mation, Action 12 provides a framework for jurisdictions seeking 
to design a disclosure regime for aggressive or abusive tax planning. 
Paralleling the work on Action 13, the work on Action 12 includes 
the design of a reporting standard that specifies who reports, what 
is reported and when information is reported, and what the conse-
quences for non-compliance are. Many of the same concerns raised 
under Action 13 for both taxpayers and governments will also arise, 
including: taxpayer burden, consistency, country-specific needs, and 
value of qualitative and group-wide information. Action 12 provides 
three key outputs in service of its general mission: (a) recommenda-
tions for the modular design of mandatory disclosure rules; (b) a 
focus on international tax schemes and consideration of a wide defini-
tion of tax benefit to capture relevant transactions; and (c) enhanced 
 73 OECD, Mandatory Disclosure Rules, Action 12—2015 Final Report 
(Paris: OECD, 2015), at 14, available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/
mandatory-disclosure-rules-action-12-2015-final-report_9789264241442-en.
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models of information sharing for international tax schemes. In order 
to achieve the necessary integration of individual country needs and 
broader international cohesiveness, the Action 12 recommendations 
for mandatory disclosure aim to allow maximum consistency between 
countries “while being sensitive to country specific needs and risks 
and the costs for tax administrations and business.”  74 
Not surprisingly, the analysis in the Final Report on Action 12, 
like that of Action 13, includes extensive consideration of burden on 
the taxpayer and the benefits to tax enforcement and tax compliance 
from mandatory disclosure of certain information. However, unlike 
Action 13, the recommendations under Action 12 are viewed explic-
itly as modular and optional for jurisdictions seeking to construct a 
mandatory reporting regime that makes the most sense within their 
legal system. Action 12 advocates for exchange of information with 
other jurisdictions regarding abusive transactions and explores how 
data gathered under mandatory disclosure could be part of the infor-
mation sharing within the Joint International Tax Shelter Information 
and Collaboration Network (JITSIC Network). 75  Although all coun-
tries should be concerned about the impact of aggressive tax planning 
structures and transactions on their tax base, many developing coun-
tries may find that their more immediate BEPS threat comes from 
“straightforward” profit shifting. In that case, the recommendations 
under Action 13 may have more significant, immediate relevance to 
such countries. That said, if developing countries currently experi-
encing BEPS through more traditional transfer pricing mechanisms 
successfully curb this loss of tax revenue, they may find that taxpay-
ers shift to more sophisticated techniques for reducing their tax bill. 
At that point, Action 12 would take on a greater role in the response of 
developing countries to BEPS.
3 .5 Summary of the OECD project on BEPS 
and transparency and disclosure
The OECD Action Plan on BEPS includes two action items directly 
bearing on transparency and disclosure. Action 12 outlines options for 
 74 Ibid., at 14.
 75 Ibid., at 81.
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jurisdictions looking to design a mandatory regime in their country for 
disclosure of aggressive tax planning. Perhaps of greater importance 
for developing countries at present, however, are the recommenda-
tions under Action 13 pertaining to documentation of transfer pricing 
and the multinational group. This action item has been the subject of 
extensive debate and comment and its three-part reporting package 
(master file, CbC template and local file) could play a very significant 
role in developing country tax enforcement. Additionally, Action 11 
might play a role in the future to the extent that its anticipated collec-
tion of broad-level data regarding the success of strategies targeting 
BEPS provides guidance on future reform.
4 . Other new developments in transparency and disclosure
4 .1 Overview
The OECD project on BEPS is the most expansive effort to address 
base erosion and profit shifting, including through transparency and 
disclosure. But it is not the only venue for such action. Other work on 
transparency, disclosure and exchange of information is taking place 
at the national, regional and global levels—including at the OECD. A 
review of these efforts helps provide a more complete picture of the 
tools being developed to enhance the ability of countries to enforce 
their tax laws in a global economy.
4 .2 Automatic exchange of information
4.2.1 Overview
Before the OECD project on BEPS began, countries were struggling 
with the question of how to improve access to taxpayer informa-
tion and thus improve tax enforcement. Although global taxpayers 
are not new and exchange of information provisions have existed in 
bilateral tax treaties for decades, the explosion of cross-border com-
mercial activity and investment by businesses and individuals has 
increased the need of tax authorities for information from locations 
outside their jurisdiction. Existing exchange of information provi-
sions in bilateral tax treaties have been insufficient, in part because 
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they generally call for exchange of information upon request. But 
that process can be slow, burdensome and difficult for requesting 
countries (see section 5.2 below). Many in the international tax com-
munity have advocated for automatic exchange of information—a 
process and commitment between or among jurisdictions to regu-
larly send country specific types of tax-related information regarding 
the taxpayers of that country. Others, however, have resisted on vari-
ous grounds, including: domestic traditions of bank secrecy, admin-
istrative burden, the inability of the recipient to meaningfully process 
large quantities of information, and privacy concerns. Perhaps a less 
often acknowledged reason that some resist automatic exchange of 
information is related to tax competition. Countries which impose 
low taxes on outsiders investing in or through their jurisdiction 
would see little upside to helping the home country gather informa-
tion and impose tax and thereby negate the “value” of “investing” in 
that low tax jurisdiction.
4.2.2 Current practices
At present, neither Article 26 (Exchange of information) of the United 
Nations Model Convention nor Article 26 of the OECD Model 
Convention requires automatic exchange (see section 5.2 below). 
However, the United Nations Commentary on Article 26 offers alter-
native language that would include automatic exchange of information 
as part of the commitment of the State. 76  The OECD Commentary on 
Article 26 similarly considers automatic exchange of information as 
one of the mechanisms available for countries to adopt. 77  The OECD 
Model Tax Information Exchange Agreement, which formally uses 
the upon-request mode of exchanging information, envisages in its 
Commentary that countries could use the document for automatic 
exchange of information subject to agreement by the two States. 78  In this 
 76 Paragraph 29.2 of the Commentary on Article 26 of the United Nations 
Model Convention.
 77 Paragraphs 9 and 9.1 of the Commentary on Article 26 of the OECD 
Model Convention.
 78 OECD, Model Tax Information Exchange Agreement (Paris: OECD, 
2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/ 
2082215.pdf. See paragraph 39 of the Commentary on Article 5.
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way, for example, a CAA for automatic exchange of CbC reports could be 
executed by two jurisdictions pursuant to their existing TIEA, based on 
the model CAA provided by the BEPS Action 13 Final Report (see sec-
tion 3.3.4 above). The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters provides for automatic exchange of informa-
tion between members pursuant to terms mutually agreed to by those 
States (see section 5.4 below). The multilateral model CAA included in 
the BEPS Action 13 Final Report serves as the foundation for agreement 
to automatically exchange CbC reports among signatory jurisdictions. 
As noted above in section 3.3.4, 57 jurisdictions have signed the CAA 
under the Multilateral Convention as at 26 January 2017.
The EU Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on adminis-
trative cooperation in the field of taxation (repealing Directive 77/799/
EEC) 79  requires mandatory automatic exchange of information, effec-
tive 1 January 2015. The Directive mandates automatic exchange of 
information in specified categories: employment income, directors’ 
fees, life insurance products, pension, ownership and income from 
immovable property. The EU Council Directive 2014/48/EU of 24 
March 2014 (amending Directive 2003/48/EC) on taxation of savings 
income in the form of interest payments 80  generally requires member 
countries to report interest income paid to an individual beneficial 
owner resident in another member State. More recently, in January 
2016, the European Commission introduced an “Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Package.”  81  Among the measures included is a proposal for amending 
the Directive for CbC reporting between member States on important 
tax-related information of MNEs operating within the EU. 82 
 79 Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
OJ:L:2011:064:0001:0012:En:PDF.
 80 Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?
uri=CELEX:32014L0048&from=EN.
 81 European Commission, “Anti-Tax Avoidance Package,” (January 
2016), available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-
tax/anti-tax-avoidance-package_en.
 82 EU Council, “European Commission Proposal for a Council Directive 
Amending Directive 2011/16/EU as Regards Mandatory Automatic Exchange 
of Information in the Field of Taxation,” at 2–3, (28 January 2016), available 
at http://euro-01aa75ed71a1.0014.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.
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4.2.3 Challenges
Successful automatic exchange of information requires several ele-
ments: (a) a common standard regarding information reporting; (b) 
due diligence by financial institutions; (c) an exchange process; (d) a 
legal framework through which to execute the exchange; and (e) com-
patible technical systems. 83  Primary challenges in moving from the 
idea of automatic information exchange to the reality of widespread 
committed implementation have included: historic bank secrecy pro-
visions, disagreement on the types of information, reciprocity, confi-
dentiality, taxpayer identification, data security, format and feasibility. 
The first challenge, bank secrecy, has been under attack since approxi-
mately 2009. Over the past seven years, most countries have substan-
tially limited or eliminated domestic rules on bank secrecy that barred 
their own financial institutions from providing client information (to 
the local government or foreign governments) and/or barred the coun-
try from providing that information to another country pursuant to 
an exchange of information request.
4.2.4 OECD, the G20 and automatic exchange
The remaining challenges have been the focus of global work over the 
past two years. As of April 2013, the G20 has formally supported the 
“progress made towards automatic exchange of information which 
is expected to be the standard, and urge[d] all jurisdictions to move 
towards exchanging information automatically with their treaty part-
ners, as appropriate.”  84  The G20 had given the OECD a mandate to 
prepare standards and guidance on automatic exchange of information. 
In February 2014, the OECD released the first part of this project, the 
“Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information: 
 83 OECD, Automatic Exchange of Information: What it is, How it works, 
Benefits, What remains to be done (Paris: OECD, 2012), available at http://
www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/automatic-exchange-of-
information-report.pdf.
 84 Communiqué, G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors (Washington, 18-19 April 2013), available at https://www.
banque-france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/Eurosysteme_
et_international/The-Final-Communique-of-G20_FM_CBG_Meeting-in-
Aprill_2013.pdf.
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Common Reporting Standard,”  85  which the G20 approved: “We 
endorse the Common Reporting Standard for automatic exchange of 
tax information on a reciprocal basis and will work with all relevant 
parties, including our financial institutions, to detail our implementa-
tion plan at our September meeting.”  86 
As a follow-up to its February 2014 document, the OECD 
released its more comprehensive “Standard for Automatic Exchange 
of Financial Account Information in Tax Matters” in July 2014. 87  The 
July report included: (a) the text of a Model Competent Authority 
Agreement (CAA) for automatic exchange of certain tax information; 
(b) the Common Reporting Standard (CRS); and (c) Commentary 
intended to facilitate uniform implementation of the agreement and 
standard. Exchange of information under this system requires that 
each country take two basic steps.
First, countries must implement any domestic law changes 
necessary for: (a) requiring financial entities to gather and report the 
designated information; and (b) ensuring appropriate protection of 
taxpayer data. Second, countries (through their competent author-
ities) must agree to the exchange on an automatic basis and must 
set the terms of that exchange (for example, the CAA). The report 
urges that this agreement be executed under the legal framework of 
the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in 
Tax Matters (see section 5.4 below) because it allows for more than 
one country to enter into such a competent authority agreement, 
potentially reducing the amount of negotiating a country must do. 
Alternatively, the competent authority agreement could be executed 
under a bilateral tax treaty between two countries. These options 
 85 OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Infor-
mation: Common Reporting Standard (Paris: OECD, 2014), available at http://
www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/automatic-exchange-finan-
cial-account-information-common-reporting-standard.pdf.
 86 Communiqué, G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors, supra note 84.
 87 OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Infor-
mation in Tax Matters (Paris: OECD, 2014), available at http://www.oecd.
org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-
financial-information-in-tax-matters.htm.
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foreshadowed the options supported by BEPS Action 13, which also 
encouraged and facilitated automatic exchange via a multilateral CAA 
under the Multilateral Convention, or a bilateral CAA under a bilat-
eral tax treaty or TIEA.
Much of the discussion and debate surrounding implementa-
tion of automatic exchange of information concerns the same ques-
tions that arose in considering the work under BEPS Action 13: the 
information to be provided, the level of burden imposed, the useful-
ness of the information and the protection of taxpayer data. One nota-
ble difference is that automatic exchange of information places the 
reporting burden on third-party financial entities, not the taxpayer.
In October 2014, 51 countries signed a Multilateral Competent 
Authority Agreement committing to automatic exchange of informa-
tion based on the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative 
Assistance in Tax Matters. Some States signed as “early adopters” 
committing to exchanges by September 2017. Others will seek to 
implement automatic exchange by 2018. In total, as at January 2017, 
over 100 jurisdictions have committed to exchange under the CRS. 88  
As a support to the automatic exchange process, the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes plans to 
establish a peer review process to ensure effective implementation of 
the new agreement, although a panel of experts from committed juris-
dictions already has been conducting “confidentiality and data safe-
guard pre-assessments of committed jurisdictions.”  89 
To the extent that the recommendations regarding automatic 
exchange of information in the July 2014 OECD report form the base-
line for automatic exchange of information relationships, developing 
countries must carefully evaluate whether its contents and structure 
would adequately meet their informational needs for the foreseeable 
future. In section 4.3 below, the Common Reporting Standard and the 
 88 OECD, Automatic Exchange Portal, “CRS by Jurisdiction,” available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/crs-implementation-and-assist 
ance/crs-by-jurisdiction/#d.en.345489.
 89 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes, Tax Transparency 2016: Report on Progress (Paris: OECD, 
2016), at 24, available at https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/GF-annual-
report-2016.pdf.
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Model Competent Authority Agreement are outlined briefly and then 
analysed from a developing country perspective.
4 .3 Common Reporting Standard and Model 
Competent Authority Agreement
4.3.1 Overview
The underlying goal of the OECD automatic exchange of information 
project is to put in place a system that: (a) enables the sharing of tax-
payer information that is necessary for effective tax enforcement; and 
(b) does so in a manner that is sufficiently uniform and standardized 
that information can be efficiently provided, shared and processed. 
The OECD commented that it drew “extensively” on the intergovern-
mental response to the United States financial reporting requirements 
(the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)) in designing the 
CRS (see section 4.5 below for further discussion of the intergovern-
mental agreements). Under this system, certain financial entities have 
an obligation to report specified information on account holders to the 
tax authorities in their own jurisdiction. That jurisdiction would then 
share the account information with the country in which the account 
holder is a resident. The expectation is that the emerging standard 
and system would be a minimum standard of sharing information 
between jurisdictions. Countries could, of course, decide to exchange 
additional information.
4.3.2 Common Reporting Standard
The CRS details the entities that must report, the type of informa-
tion to be reported, the types of accounts for which information must 
be reported and the due diligence required of the reporting finan-
cial entities.
Reporting entities: Under the CRS, the following types of finan-
cial institutions are required to participate in reporting financial 
information of taxpayers: custodial institutions, depository institu-
tions, investment entities and specified insurance companies (unless 
there is low risk of evasion). In November 2016, the OECD reported 
that financial institutions in over 50 participating jurisdictions were 
already collecting information to be exchanged in 2017, and have in 
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place the necessary implementing international agreements. Financial 
institutions in an additional 50 countries are expected to join the 
reporting process for 2018. 90 
Information provided: The types of financial information to 
be provided by the reporting financial entities include: interest, divi-
dends, account balance or value, income from certain insurance 
produces, sales proceeds from financial assets, and other income 
generated by assets held in the account or payments made with respect 
to the account. 91 
Covered accounts: The accounts (“reportable accounts”) for which 
reporting must be made by the reporting financial entities include 
accounts held by individuals and entities (including trusts and foun-
dations). To limit evasive tax planning, the reporting financial entities 
must look through passive entities and report on the controlling persons. 
In terms of providing identifying information regarding the account, 
the financial entity must report the “name, address, jurisdiction(s) of 
residence, TIN(s) and date and place of birth (in the case of an individ-
ual) of each Reportable Person that is an Account Holder.”  92 
Due diligence: To ensure meaningful and effective provision of 
information, reporting financial entities must perform a specified level 
of due diligence aimed at securing accurate information regarding the 
identity of the account holder. Different standards of diligence are 
applied depending upon when the account was created, its contents, 
its value and other information known to the financial entity.
4.3.3 Model Competent Authority Agreement
The CAA is drafted as a bilateral agreement between two jurisdictions 
to commit to the automatic exchange of financial account informa-
tion. Pursuant to the agreement, the countries agree to have domestic 
rules requiring financial institutions to report accounts and follow due 
 90 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes, Tax Transparency 2016: Report on Progress, supra note 
89, at 22.
 91 OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Infor-
mation in Tax Matters, supra note 87, at 15.
 92 Ibid., at 29.
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diligence procedures consistent with the CRS and the terms of the spe-
cific CAA. Additionally, the signatories confirm that they have: (a) the 
appropriate safeguards to protect the confidentiality of taxpayer data; 
and (b) the infrastructure necessary for effective exchange (includ-
ing mechanisms for “timely, accurate, and confidential information 
exchanges, effective and reliable communications, and capabilities to 
promptly resolve questions and concerns about exchanges or requests 
for exchanges”). 93 
4.3.4 Developing country analysis
4.3.4.1 Overview
A range of developing countries have expressed interest in automatic 
exchange of information and a number of them have already commit-
ted to exchange for either 2017 or 2018. 94  Income tax evasion poses 
a serious fiscal challenge for many developing countries which rely 
substantially on the income tax base. Current methods for obtaining 
information located outside the jurisdiction can be costly or unavail-
able. Treaties generally permit exchange of information only upon 
request (a process that can be burdensome in terms of time, money 
and expertise). Moreover, many developing countries have a more lim-
ited treaty network (even including TIEAs), and may not have treaties 
with key tax haven jurisdictions (used by their residents to avoid the 
developing country income tax). As a result, some developing coun-
tries are among those who have committed to early adoption of the 
CRS (see section 4.2.4 above)
4.3.4.2 Advantages of the Common Reporting Standard 
and the Competent Authority Agreement
The overall automatic exchange of information project advances the 
potential for meaningful income tax enforcement. Widespread dis-
semination of relevant taxpayer information to the appropriate taxing 
authorities enhances real enforcement and, more broadly, alerts taxpay-
ers to the risks of tax evasion. As noted in section 4.3.4.1 above, current 
 93 Ibid., at 21–22.
 94 OECD, Automatic Exchange Portal, “CRS by Jurisdiction,” 
supra note 88.
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information exchange mechanisms can be too burdensome to serve as 
a regular component of tax enforcement. Automatic, bulk provision 
of the information enumerated in the CRS would significantly reduce 
the costs of acquiring that information through existing mechanisms. 
Additionally, the automatic nature of the delivery reduces the opportu-
nity for pressure, leverage and corruption in tax administration.
The scope of taxpayers whose accounts are covered by the CRS 
further increases the value of the information exchange. The decision 
to include entities and not just individuals, and to reach trusts and 
other often opaque holding structures, expands the coverage of this 
automatic exchange of information system beyond that of some other 
programmes.
4.3.4.3 Limitations of the Common Reporting Standard 
and the Competent Authority Agreement
The advantages of the CRS and CAA described above essentially reflect 
the reduced costs and difficulties of acquiring information compared 
with obtaining it via an existing bilateral treaty. But the ability to par-
ticipate in the CRS and CAA is currently contingent upon; (a) meeting 
the standards necessary to commit to providing—not just receiving—
information (required reciprocity); and (b) getting the key jurisdiction 
to sign a CAA (participation).
4.3.4.3.1 Reciprocity
The CAA is premised on reciprocity between or among signatories. 
Although countries may sign a CAA in advance of being ready to par-
ticipate, the agreement takes effect only when they are in fact prepared 
to share information reciprocally. 95  The only option for non-reciprocal 
participation in the CRS and CAA is provided for countries which do 
“not need to be reciprocal” (for example, because one of the jurisdic-
tions does not have an income tax). 96  This has been characterized by 
some commentators as intended to facilitate automatic exchange of 
information from tax havens. There is no current model or provision 
 95 See, for example, OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Finan-
cial Account Information in Tax Matters, supra note 87, at 27.
 96 Ibid., at 223.
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allowing for non-reciprocal automatic exchange of information with 
(or more precisely, to) a developing country (that is to say, providing 
information to that developing country without receiving information 
in return). The absence of such an alternative may render the current 
CRS and CAA out of reach of developing countries that cannot currently 
commit to or meet the standards for domestic collection of the required 
tax information (that is, the domestic law provisions and enforcement 
of data collection from reporting financial entities) and the processing 
and transmission of the information (inside the tax administration). 
These developing countries could benefit from the receipt of information 
under automatic information exchange, however. The only requirement 
they would need to meet would be the protection of taxpayer data. Even 
if the developing country were not yet able to make maximum use of the 
bulk data it receives, the country could nonetheless begin to improve tax 
enforcement with the information.
If non-reciprocity with developing countries were permitted, it 
could be managed in a gradual manner. The country could commit 
to meeting established benchmarks for domestic information collec-
tion and processing. While the country was meeting the benchmarks, 
it could receive information under the CRS and CAA, with the goal 
being full and reciprocal participation. The loss for the other country 
during this period of time would likely be minimal. Developing coun-
tries are typically not the financial destinations of major tax evaders, 
and developed countries would likely receive little significant infor-
mation from this automatic exchange of information. Thus, the cost 
of helping developing countries improve tax collection while build-
ing their internal capacity to fully participate in automatic exchange 
should not be unduly high.
Although a reciprocity phase-in is not currently part of the CRS 
automatic exchange structure, the Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes has identified technical assis-
tance as an important key in enabling developing countries to partici-
pate in and benefit from the automatic exchange. 97  The Global Forum 
has five pilot projects under way that partner a developing country with 
 97 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes, Tax Transparency 2016: Report on Progress, supra note 
89, at 26.
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a developed country. 98  The goal is to help the developing country imple-
ment the new CRS standard in an “appropriate” time frame. Any devel-
oping country member “which is not a financial centre” can request to 
participate in this technical assistance pilot programme. 99 
More broadly, the Global Forum has introduced a new 
programme, an “Induction Programme,” designed to help new 
members (most of which are developing countries) become familiar 
with the work of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange 
of Information for Tax Purposes, and to assist them on implement-
ing standards, preparing for reviews, and putting in place the infra-
structure necessary to participate in and benefit from the information 
exchange mechanisms. The Induction Programme engages not only 
with the tax administration but also with the finance ministries in the 
developing countries. Current assistance under way includes drafting 
of automatic exchange of information legislation (assisting 20 juris-
dictions), data confidentiality safeguards and information security 
management (assisting 5 jurisdictions), and automatic exchange imple-
mentation seminars (113 participants representing 41 jurisdictions). 100  
Additionally, the Global Forum has engaged with regional partner-
ships in Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. 101 
4.3.4.3.2 Participation
Even with adequate infrastructure to participate in automatic exchange 
of information under the CRS and CAA, developing countries must 
 98 The paired jurisdictions are: (a) Albania and Italy, (b) Colombia and 
Spain, (c) Ghana and the United Kingdom, (d) Morocco and France, and 
(e) Philippines and Australia. OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Tax Transparency 2016: Report 
on Progress, supra note 89, at 26.
 99 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes, Tax Transparency 2016: Report on Progress, supra note 
89, at 26.
 100 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Informa-
tion for Tax Purposes, Tax Transparency 2016: Report on Progress, supra note 
89, at 30.
 101 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Informa-
tion for Tax Purposes, Tax Transparency 2016: Report on Progress, supra note 
89, at 31.
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actually be able to persuade partner countries to sign these agreements. 
The bilateral version offered as the main example of a CAA would be 
less effective for many developing countries. It would have to be nego-
tiated on a bilateral basis with each country and could be completed 
only with current treaty partners (bilateral tax treaties or TIEAs). The 
alternative, multilateral version of a CAA provided in Annex 1 of the 
July 2104 OECD document (signed by 51 countries in October 2014, 
and a total of 87 as at 2 November 2016) 102  has its legal basis in the 
Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters (see section 4.2.4 above). 103  This multilateral version offers 
two key advantages to developing countries— only a single agreement 
to negotiate and a wide pool of potential signatory partners. There are, 
however, three problems.
First, with the availability and prominence of the bilateral 
version, there may be inadequate motivation for some countries to 
pursue the multilateral one, although the number of signatories 
suggests this may not prove to be a significant problem. Second, even if 
countries do participate in a multilateral CAA, it is not clear that they 
would be required to invite a developing country to sign (signatories 
to the multilateral CAA for automatic exchange retain the power to 
determine which other signatories they will accept as exchange part-
ners). Specifically, some developing countries that have been unable to 
sign treaties with tax havens may be concerned that tax havens would 
also refuse to participate in a CAA with them. Yet these havens are key 
jurisdictions from which a developing country may need to acquire 
tax information, and unlike developed countries the developing coun-
try may have little leverage to persuade or entice the participation of 
the tax haven. Finally, unlike the United States FATCA regime, which 
inspired the CRS and CAA, it is not clear what sanctions would apply to 
non-participants. The absence of sanctions may be a concern for devel-
oping countries that are trying to get tax havens to join them in a CAA.
 102 OECD, “Signatories of the Multilateral Competent Authority Agree-
ment on Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information and Intend-
ed First Information Exchange Date, Status as of 2 November 2016,” available 
at https://www.oecd.org/tax/automatic-exchange/international-framework-
for-the-crs/MCAA-Signatories.pdf.
 103 OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Infor-
mation in Tax Matters, supra note 87, at 215.
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4 .4 Industry-specific reporting requirements 
(natural resources, financial services)
Industry-specific CbC reporting has also been a focus of increased 
transparency for countries. For example, United States securities law 
regulations now require extractive industries to report various pay-
ments made to foreign governments by businesses engaged in extrac-
tive industries (exploration, extraction, processing and export of oil, 
natural gas or minerals, or the acquisition of a licence to engage in such 
activity). These payments, which must be reported on a country-by-
country basis, include “taxes, royalties, fees (including licence fees), 
production entitlements, bonuses, and other material benefits.”  104 
On a more global scale, the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) seeks to promote a two-pronged reporting approach 
for transparency in extractive industries 105  under which businesses 
report what they pay to each jurisdiction, and the governments report 
what they receive. 106  However, work on industry-targeted disclosure 
has not been limited to extractive industries. Directive 2013/36/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervi-
sion of credit institutions and investment firms (amending Directive 
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC) 107  
seeks disclosure by covered financial institutions of information on a 
country-by-country basis, including: profit or loss before tax, tax paid, 
subsidies received, average number of employees. Member States of 
the EU must enact rules domestically to require the reporting. 108 
 104 United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. section 
78m(q)(1)(A)(2012). Implementing regulations were issued in July 2016. Dis-
closure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 81 Fed. Reg. 49,359 (27 
July 2016).
 105 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Fact Sheet 2014, avail-
able at http://eiti.org/files/2014-03-26%20Factsheet%20English_0.pdf.
 106 EITI countries and country reports are available at http://eiti.org/
countries.
 107 Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
OJ:L:2013:176:0338:0436:EN:PDF.
 108 See, for example, the United Kingdom reporting rules which came 
into effect in January 2014, with the first reporting required by 1 July 2014. See 
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In some cases, efforts to combat corruption prompted the 
push for transparency and disclosure initiatives. Where transpar-
ency and disclosure serve an anti-corruption role, the public release of 
disclosed information can be important. Not surprisingly, the nature 
and scope of any public disclosure of taxpayer data has generated 
debate and objection in the business community (see sections 2.4 and 
3.3.5.4 above).
Although the issue of public disclosure of taxpayer information 
has been raised by some advocates in the context of BEPS (see section 
3.3.5.4 above), the OECD does not expect that Action 13 files would be 
made available to the public. But corruption concerns have surfaced as 
a possible factor in the limited collection of income tax in some coun-
tries, and public disclosure of at least some information in the master 
file, CbC template and/or local file could play a role in improving tax 
enforcement.
4 .5 Intergovernmental agreements 
and related developments
In 2010, the United States enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (FATCA). 109  Prompted by the number of United States taxpayers 
using offshore financial accounts to avoid United States income tax, 
the new legislation effectively requires a wide range of financial insti-
tutions (foreign and domestic) to provide data to the United States 
regarding its taxpayers who hold accounts at those institutions. The 
FATCA legislation imposes due diligence and reporting burdens on 
these third-party entities, and failure to comply can result in nega-
tive United States tax consequences for the financial institutions’ own 
United States source income.
In an effort to streamline compliance for foreign financial entities 
required to report under FATCA, and to address various disclosure 
also final United Kingdom regulations, available at http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/uksi/2013/3118/made, and final United Kingdom guidance, available 
at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/capital-requirements-coun-
try-by-country-reporting-regulations-2013-guidance/capital-requirements-
country-by-country-reporting-regulations-2013-guidance.
 109 United States Internal Revenue Code, sections 1471–1474.
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and confidentiality concerns, a number of countries entered into inter-
governmental agreements (IGAs) with the United States that provided 
specific guidance on the type of information that their own domes-
tic financial institutions would gather on United States taxpayers 
and detailed how that information would be provided to the United 
States. 110  These IGAs were negotiated under the legal framework of 
the existing bilateral tax treaty of each country with the United States. 
Given the increasing number of IGAs being signed with the United 
States, other countries have expressed interest in receiving the same 
type of tax-related information on the foreign financial accounts of 
their own residents, and have pursued a broader IGA format. 111 
4 .6 Beneficial ownership information
Concern over the level of transparency in some jurisdictions regard-
ing beneficial ownership of entities is not new, but the topic received 
renewed attention in 2016 following a high-profile global leak of signif-
icant beneficial ownership data. A number of jurisdictions have now 
turned their attention to the importance of transparency regarding 
beneficial ownership of offshore entities. Some have announced steps 
to register the beneficial ownership of offshore trusts and other enti-
ties. 112  The G5 countries have agreed to develop a global multilateral 
 110 Ultimately, the United States provided two model intergovernmen-
tal agreements that formed the basis of its negotiations with other countries, 
IGA Model 1 and Model 2.
 111 See, for example, letter dated 9 April 2013, signed by the finance min-
isters of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom announcing 
their pilot programme to automatically exchange information (a “multilateral 
exchange facility”), available at http://taxnews.lexisnexis.co.uk/TaxNewsLive/
Members/BreakingNewsFullText.aspx?id=4335&css=1&xml=0. The signato-
ries encouraged other European Union member States to join them in their 
pilot programme based on IGAs signed with the United States pursuant to 
FATCA. See also Itai Grinberg, “Taxing Capital in Emerging Countries: Will 
FATCA Open the Door?” (2013) Vol. 5, World Tax Journal, 325.
 112 These jurisdictions include Australia, Germany, Ireland, New Zea-
land and the United Kingdom. William Hoke, “Government to Review Trust 
Disclosures,” (2016) Vol. 82, Tax Notes International, 242; Teri Sprackland, 
“German Transparency Registry Proposal Derided as ‘Joke’,” (2016) Vol. 82, 
Tax Notes International, 249; Stephanie Soong Johnston, “More Countries 
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system for automatic exchange of beneficial ownership information, 
and the European Commission adopted a proposal in July 2016 for full 
public access to beneficial ownership registries for certain entities. 113  
These developments in the context of beneficial ownership reveal the 
increasingly intertwined, though not uncontroversial, expectations 
regarding both transparency and disclosure to tax administrations 
and transparency and disclosure to the public.
4 .7 Exchange of government information
A new EU Council Directive of 8 December 2015 called on member 
States to agree to automatic exchange of advance cross-border tax rul-
ings and advance pricing agreements. 114  The impetus for this 2015 
Directive came from the public awareness that tax rulings were issued 
in some member States resulting in low taxes on “artificially high 
amounts of income in the country issuing . . . the advance ruling” and 
yet leave “artificially low amounts of income to be taxed in any other 
country involved” in the transactions or financial flows. 115  Relatedly, 
in June 2015, the European Commission launched a consultation on 
corporate transparency, exploring whether requiring MNEs to dis-
close more information about taxes paid (via public CbC reporting), 
and/or public disclosure of tax rulings, would reduce tax avoidance 
Commit to Public Beneficial Ownership Registries,” (2016) Vol. 82, Tax Notes 
International, 649.
 113 Ryan Finley, “EU Countries Announce Beneficial Ownership 
Exchange Plan,” (2016) Vol. 82, Tax Notes International, 238; Alexander Lew-
is, “EU Adopts Public Registries of Beneficial Ownership Information,” (2016) 
Vol. 83, Tax Notes International, 100.
 114 EU Council Directive 2015/2376. 2015 O.J. (L332) 1, 203 (EU), avail-
able at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32
015L2376&qid=1487009643392&from=en.
 115 Ibid., at 1. In parallel developments, the European Parliament created 
the Special Committee on Tax Rulings and Other Measures Similar in Nature 
or Effect (TAXE 1), which was tasked with investigating ruling practices. The 
European Parliament adopted the final report of the Special Committee on 
25 November 2015; the report contains legislative recommendations for tax 
transparency and for EU-wide tax policy convergence through a common 
corporate tax base, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-0408+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.
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and aggressive tax structuring by MNEs. 116  In July 2015, the mem-
bers of the European Parliament voted in favour of a revised Directive 
requiring CbC reporting of taxes paid by MNEs. 117 
4 .8 Summary of other developments in 
transparency and disclosure
In addition to the OECD project on BEPS, there are several other global 
efforts to limit base erosion and profit shifting. The OECD and G20 have 
been advocating introduction of automatic exchange of information 
including a “Common Reporting Standard” for the information that 
should be exchanged. The OECD released its comprehensive standard 
in July 2014 (including the CRS itself), a Model Competent Authority 
Agreement and a Commentary (to facilitate uniform implementation). 
The CRS specifies which financial entities must report taxpayer infor-
mation, which information must be reported and which accounts are 
subject to reporting. Exchange of information as a tool for transpar-
ency and disclosure avoids the burdens of pursuing exchange upon 
request. But it still requires an agreement to the exchange. The imple-
mentation of a multilateral CAA through the Multilateral Convention 
on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters obviates the need 
to enter into many bilateral arrangements. This would be an advan-
tage for countries with few current treaties and limited resources for 
tax administration. In October 2014, over 50 countries signed a mul-
tilateral CAA to implement automatic exchange of information (see 
section 4.2.4 above). However, even this path (use of the Multilateral 
Convention) would not guarantee that crucial jurisdictions would join 
 116 European Commission Press Release, “Commission Launches Public 
Consultation on Corporate Tax Transparency,” (17 June 2015), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5156_en.htm; European Com-
mission, “Factual Summary of the Responses to the Public Consultation on 
Assessing the Potential for Further Transparency on Corporate Income Tax-
es, European Commission” (20 January 2016), available at http://ec.europa.
eu/finance/consultations/2015/further-corporate-tax-transparency/docs/
summary-of-responses_en.pdf.
 117 European Parliament, “Texts Adopted” (8 July 2015), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONS 
GML+TA+P8-TA-2015-0257+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.
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a developing country in exchange of information. Another barrier for 
developing countries is the “reciprocal” nature of the CAA. Exchanges 
would start only after both countries complied fully under the agree-
ment. Phasing in reciprocity would allow developing countries to 
receive valuable tax information and tackle base erosion straight away, 
while building their internal capacity to comply with all aspects of 
the CAA. Other potentially interesting initiatives for transparency 
and disclosure include: (a) efforts such as the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, which encourages industry-based reporting 
of tax payments (with both business and government reporting pay-
ments and receipts); (b) bilateral and regional efforts to replicate the 
kind of information exchange being promised under IGAs that have 
been signed in the wake of the new United States reporting require-
ments for financial entities; (c) transparency and disclosure of ben-
eficial ownership of entities; and (d) disclosure of tax rulings to other 
governments, and potentially the public.
5 . Existing mechanisms supporting 
transparency and disclosure
5 .1 Overview
Significant attention has been directed to transparency and disclosure 
in recent years, but these concepts are not new to the tax system. For 
example, tax treaties have included exchange of information provi-
sions for decades, which although more limited in scope and effect 
than some of the transparency and disclosure projects currently under 
way, have nonetheless sought to enhance access of a tax administration 
to vital taxpayer data. A brief review of these existing mechanisms 
which support and facilitate tax transparency and disclosure provides: 
(a) a better understanding of what may be needed in new mechanisms; 
and (b) the role that these current agreements or structures can play 
in supporting any new developments in transparency and disclosure.
5 .2 Article 26 of the Model Conventions
Both the United Nations Model Convention and the OECD Model 
Convention include an Article 26 (Exchange of information) that 
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outlines the primary terms governing exchange of information 
between the two signatories: the duty to exchange, the duty to protect 
taxpayer information, the grounds upon which a request for informa-
tion can be declined and the grounds which do not form an appropri-
ate basis for refusal to exchange information. The United Nations 118  
and OECD versions of Article 26 (and their respective Commentaries) 
differ in some regards and on balance share several common deficits, 
but their common features are reflected in the bilateral tax treaties 
of many countries. Moreover, as referenced below, changes have been 
made to Article 26 of both Conventions in an effort to increase the 
likelihood of meaningful exchange of information.
5.2.1 Standard governing requests
As noted earlier, Article 26 of neither the United Nations nor the 
OECD Model Convention requires automatic exchange of infor-
mation. Thus, countries requesting information must meet certain 
thresholds for documenting their request (in other words, “no fishing 
expeditions”). This step limits jurisdictions to requesting information 
only about taxpayers and activities for which they already have some 
knowledge. Moreover, the specific threshold requirements imposed by 
existing bilateral tax treaties decrease the likelihood that information 
will be requested. Recent changes to Article 26 of the United Nations 
Model Convention decreased the impact of these “thresholds.” For 
example, changes to Article 26 (1) in 2011 sought to extend the scope 
of exchange of information by providing that information should be 
exchanged if it is “foreseeably relevant for carrying out the provisions 
of [the] Convention or to the administration or enforcement of the 
domestic laws of the Contracting States.” The phrase “foreseeably 
relevant” replaced the earlier term “necessary.”  119  The Commentary 
 118 At its twelfth session in Geneva, 11–14 October 2016, the United 
Nations Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters 
introduced “Proposed BEPS-related Changes to the United Nations Model 
Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries,” 
(E/C.18/2016/CRP.10), available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/
uploads/2016/10/12STM_CRP10_-beps.pdf. Although the provisions are 
BEPS related, they do not bear directly on the application of Article 26.
 119 Paragraph 4 of the Commentary on Article 26 of the United Nations 
Model Convention characterized the change to “foreseeably relevant” as one 
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on Article 26 of the United Nations Model Convention offers some 
alternative language for the new phrase “foreseeably relevant,” but 
these options are intended to allow treaty partners to choose language 
that they find clear in specifying the goal of “effective” exchange of 
information. 120 
Despite the expanded scope of exchange of information under 
the “foreseeably relevant” language of Article 26, it is important to 
note that automatic exchange of information entirely eliminates even 
a broad test for demonstrating the connection between the requested 
information and the investigation of the taxing authorities. The auto-
matic receipt of specified bulk data effectively would place no such 
constraints on jurisdictions seeking information in the designated 
categories. Additionally, the current “upon request” process requires 
an allocation of the potentially limited resources of the request-
ing country, which would be alleviated under automatic exchange of 
information.
5.2.2 Bank secrecy
Historically, States have declined to comply with a request for infor-
mation under Article 26 on the grounds that compliance would violate 
domestic law, specifically, bank secrecy rules. Where countries had 
such domestic law provisions severely limiting (often under significant 
penalty) the ability of a financial institution to share information with 
the government regarding a client, and/or limiting the ability of the 
government to share such information with another country, domestic 
law regularly trumped the operation of Article 26. In 2011, Article 26 
of the United Nations Model Convention was revised to provide that 
certain domestic laws may not be used as a defence in complying with 
an exchange of information request. Thus, the new language in Article 
26 (5) states: “In no case shall the provision of paragraph 3 [outlin-
ing appropriate grounds to refuse a request] be construed to permit a 
Contracting State to decline to supply information solely because the 
information is held by a bank, other financial institution, nominee or 
that was not substantive. Rather, it was intended to “remove doubts” and 
“clarify” the prior language.
 120 Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention also uses the phrase “fore-
seeably relevant.”
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person acting in an agency or a fiduciary capacity or because it relates 
to ownership interests in a person.”  121 
5.2.3 Information sought not needed by requested State 
for own purposes
A further 2011 change to Article 26 of the United Nations Model 
Convention sought to eliminate an additional argument that a State 
might use to decline to provide requested information: that the State 
asked to produce the information has itself no need or use for the 
information in administering its tax law. Article 26 (4) now provides 
that: “If information is requested by a Contracting State in accord-
ance with this Article, the other Contracting State shall use its 
information-gathering measures to obtain the requested information, 
even though that other State may not need such information for its 
own tax purposes.” Anticipating that some States might try to argue 
that they are not legally capable of providing information that they 
do not need for a tax purpose (despite the language in Article 26 (4)), 
the United Nations Commentary on Article 26 offers alternative lan-
guage. This alternative phrasing requires that each Contracting State 
must undertake to ensure that its competent authority will have the 
requisite power under domestic law to secure the information needed 
for tax treaty information exchange purposes. In some cases, domestic 
legislation, rulemaking or administrative changes may be necessary to 
ensure that power. 122 
5.2.4 Format
Article 26 exchange of information provisions do not require that 
information be provided in a certain format. But more uniformity in 
the content and format of information provided by taxpayers to the 
government might, increasingly, lead to the government of a requesting 
State receiving information in a desired format. For example, recom-
mendations under BEPS Action 13 would notably enhance transpar-
ency and disclosure by requiring that taxpayers collect, generate and 
 121 Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention also bars refusal on the 
grounds of bank secrecy.
 122 See paragraph 26.3 of the Commentary on Article 26 of the United 
Nations Model Convention.
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provide information in a specified format to the tax authorities. This 
rule, implemented in each jurisdiction through domestic legislation 
(master file, CbC template and local file reporting requirements), 
would shift the burden to the taxpayers, who have a distinct ability 
to access their own information. To the extent that reporting for the 
master file, CbC template and local file is fairly uniform and consistent 
over time, across countries and across taxpayers, the information may 
be easier for tax authorities to use. For resource-constrained develop-
ing countries, this uniformity could facilitate training and decrease 
audit burdens.
5.2.5 Article 26 of the Model Conventions: summary
Existing bilateral tax treaties still constitute a relevant tool in encour-
aging transparency and disclosure. First, they can provide the legal 
basis or framework for an agreement between competent authorities 
to exchange information on an automatic basis (as can TIEAs or the 
Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters (see sections 5.3 and 5.4 below)). Second, they may explicitly 
permit requests regarding persons neither resident nor engaged in 
economic activity in the State from which information is sought. An 
automatic exchange of information arrangement would be unlikely 
to include data regarding such persons. Third, the “residual” ability 
under Article 26 provisions to seek information upon request remains 
useful if a country finds that it requires information beyond the scope 
of that provided automatically.
Although bilateral treaty provisions based on Article 26 of either 
the United Nations or the OECD Model Convention are inadequate 
in meeting the full range of transparency and disclosure needs of tax 
administrations today, they continue to provide possible access to 
information not likely available through automatic exchange of infor-
mation or through the taxpayer reporting envisaged by BEPS Action 
13 recommendations.
5 .3 Tax Information Exchange Agreements
TIEAs are stand-alone agreements, typically negotiated between 
countries that have not negotiated a bilateral tax treaty, that focus 
exclusively on exchange of information. The expectation is that even 
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countries that do not have a bilateral treaty may still seek to exchange 
tax information. The TIEA provides the legal basis and structure for 
doing so. The OECD Model TIEA, not surprisingly, is very similar to 
Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention (and the United Nations 
Model Convention). The primary differences between the OECD 
Model TIEA and Article 26 include the following: (a) TIEAs can be 
bilateral or multilateral; (b) TIEAs focus on exchange “upon request”; 
(c) TIEAs cover specific taxes; and (d) TIEAs provide more detail 
regarding the information that the requesting State must provide to 
initiate its request.
For countries pursuing increased transparency and disclo-
sure in tax, TIEAs provide a legal framework and context to agree to 
exchange information automatically. That is, although TIEAs call for 
exchange “upon request,” they permit contracting States to expand 
their cooperation through agreement by the competent authorities. 
Thus, as with comprehensive bilateral treaties in the case of Article 26, 
TIEAs can serve as the legal foundation for countries to agree to auto-
matic exchange under CRS and under the BEPS Action 13 CbC frame-
work. To the extent that some developing countries have a more limited 
network of comprehensive tax treaties but do have a network of TIEAs, 
such a role for TIEAs could become important.
5 .4 Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters
The multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in 
Tax Matters, which originally was developed by the OECD and the 
Council of Europe in 1988, was amended in 2011 to welcome all coun-
tries as participants. 123  At present, over 60 countries have signed the 
Convention, including developing countries. The Convention must be 
signed and ratified by a country in order for it to apply—and countries 
can make individual reservations to the basic terms of the Convention. 
As a result, reliance on the Convention depends upon whether the 
countries in question have ratified it and whether they have made any 
 123 OECD-Council of Europe, Convention on Mutual Administra-
tive Assistance in Tax Matters, 2011, available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/
exchange-of-tax-information/ENG-Amended-Convention.pdf.
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relevant reservations to significant terms. But, as a multilateral frame-
work, the Convention offers a potentially valuable legal foundation for 
countries looking to pursue enhanced transparency and disclosure 
among a group of nations in a relatively simultaneous and efficient way.
With respect to exchange of information, the Convention 
includes a comprehensive consideration of: (a) prerequisites to 
exchange; (b) what can be exchanged; and (c) the mechanism for 
exchange. As drafted, the Convention envisages exchange of infor-
mation upon request, spontaneously and automatically (according to 
procedures and terms mutually agreed to by two or more parties). 124  
The Commentary on the Convention emphasizes the value of stand-
ardization in automatic exchange, noting savings in time and work-
load, but observes that these advantages accrue primarily when large 
numbers of countries participate in the standardization process. The 
Multilateral CAA that was signed by 51 countries in October 2014 (and 
by over 100 as at January 2017), committing to automatic exchange of 
information, is grounded in the legal framework of the Convention, 
with the advantages and concerns for developing countries noted in 
sections 4.3.4.2 and 4.3.4.3 above.
5 .5 Regional agreements
In addition to bilateral tax treaties, TIEAs and the Multilateral 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, 
regional agreements exist which could serve as the legal basis and 
framework for exchange of information among the signatory States. 
Examples of such regional agreements include: (a) the 2008 West African 
Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) Income and Inheritance Tax 
Convention (Article 33); (b) the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) Limited Multilateral Agreement on Avoidance 
of Double Taxation and Mutual Administrative Assistance (Article 5); 
and (c) the Agreement Among the Member States of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Profits 
or Gains and Capital Gains and for the Encouragement of Regional 
Trade and Investment (Article 24). However, a major limitation of 
 124 Ibid., Articles 6 and 7.
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regional agreements is their membership. Both the requesting State 
and the country from which it is seeking information must be mem-
bers of the applicable regional agreement. To the extent that the tax-
payers of a country conduct business or hold their assets and accounts 
in other jurisdictions, the regional agreements offer little assistance. 
Moreover, their relatively abbreviated exchange of information provi-
sions do not detail the expectations regarding the delivery mechanism 
for information and do not call for automatic exchange.
5 .6 Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange 
of Information for Tax Purposes
5.6.1 Overview
In the late 1990s, many countries became concerned with the effects 
of tax havens and preferential tax regimes which impeded effective 
tax enforcement by virtue of their lack of transparency and their lack 
of information exchange. As a response, the predecessor of the cur-
rent Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes was formed in 2000 under the auspices of the 
OECD. The Global Forum has 139 members (as at February 2017), 125  
including developed and developing countries, and OECD and 
non-OECD members.
The Global Forum has pursued two projects relevant to transpar-
ency and disclosure: (a) the development of the Model Tax Information 
Exchange Agreement (TIEA) (see section 5.3 above); and (b) the devel-
opment and implementation of the peer review process (the legal and 
regulatory framework for assessing countries’ compliance with the 
standards for transparency and exchange of information). The peer 
review process, which began in 2009, is undertaken in two phases 
(Phase 1 and Phase 2), although they can be combined. 126  The review 
evaluates a country by reference to its capacity for and actual perfor-
mance in providing information upon request. Thus, the peer review 
process explores the degree to which a country is compliant with 
 125 See http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/.
 126 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes, Tax Transparency 2016: Report on Progress, supra note 89.
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commitments under treaty provisions comparable to Article 26 of the 
United Nations and OECD Model Conventions, or to the Model TIEA. 
Additionally, following the signing of the Multilateral CAA for auto-
matic exchange, the Global Forum announced its intent to establish a 
peer review process to ensure compliance with the exchange commit-
ment (see section 4.2.4 above).
The current peer review process examines the domestic laws and 
practices of a country along a number of dimensions to assess whether: 
(a) the ownership and identity of entities and arrangements are avail-
able to the competent authority; (b) reliable accounting records are 
maintained for such entities; (c) account holder banking information 
is available; (d) the competent authority has the power to obtain and 
provide information pursuant to an exchange of information request; 
(e) appropriate safeguards apply to persons in the requested country; 
(f) all relevant partners are covered by the network of information 
exchange mechanisms of the jurisdiction; (g) adequate confidentiality 
mechanisms exist to protect information received; (h) the rights and 
safeguards of taxpayers and third parties are respected; and (i) infor-
mation is provided in a timely manner for requests made under its 
exchange of information mechanisms.
Input is sought from all members of the Global Forum during 
the process of reviewing a specific country. 127  Members complete an 
extensive questionnaire about their own practical experience in work-
ing with the country under review. The review is performed by an 
assessment team (two expert assessors from peer jurisdictions, along 
with a coordinator from the Global Forum secretariat). The report of 
the team is presented to the 30-member Peer Review Group (PRG), 
and upon approval becomes a formal report of the PRG. At that stage, 
the entire membership of the Global Forum is asked to approve the 
report. To date, 113 countries have participated in the peer review 
process and have been the subject of a completed and published report. 
 127 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Informa-
tion for Tax Purposes, Information Brief, supra note 7, at 6 –7; OECD, Global 
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, 
Exchange of Information on Request: Handbook for Peer Reviews 2016 –2020 
(Paris: OECD, 2016), at 42, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/transpar-
ency/global-forum-handbook-2016.pdf.
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As part of the review process, recommendations are made to coun-
tries for ways in which to improve their ability to participate and 
cooperate in exchange of information. Over 80 countries have intro-
duced or proposed domestic law changes in order to implement the 
more than 400 recommendations that have emerged from the peer 
review process. 128 
5.6.2 Developing countries and the Global Forum
From the perspective of a developing country, a number of observa-
tions can be offered regarding the work of the Global Forum. First, 
the promotion of TIEAs can be beneficial to jurisdictions not cur-
rently in a position to negotiate many bilateral treaties. Second, to the 
extent that the peer review process improves the general transparency 
of domestic banking, tax and regulatory rules of other jurisdictions, 
developing countries may gain. Assuming that developing countries 
would have had little leverage to instigate these transparency changes 
on their own, they may now find that their information requests made 
to other jurisdictions are more efficiently managed.
Third, a peer review of a developing country itself may provide 
support for the internal efforts of the tax administration to encour-
age and effectuate domestic law (and practice) changes consistent with 
active participation in exchange of information. This will be most 
true where the developing country receives any needed and requested 
technical assistance on the more detailed facets of managing infor-
mation and requests. 129  As discussed above in section 4.3.4.3.1, the 
Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax 
Purposes has introduced new programmes to provide more effec-
tive and targeted technical assistance to developing countries. Fourth, 
the current benchmark for the peer reviews is exchange upon request 
(which still imposes burdens on developing countries (see section 
 128 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes, Information Brief, supra note 7, at 4.
 129 See, for example, OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Tax Transparency 2013: Report 
on Progress (Paris: OECD, 2013), at 23 (outlining technical assistance oppor-
tunities), available at http://www.eoi-tax.org/keydocs/f6eb5861601672f34b5e
25e8a4f57380#default.
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4.3.4.1 above)). But the domestic law and infrastructure standards 
that the peer review process promotes would also be essential if and 
when countries ultimately adopt some version of automatic exchange 
of information. Finally, to gain the maximum benefit from enhanced 
compliance by other countries, developing countries need to be in a 
position to request information (until automatic exchange takes hold) 
and to make effective use of such information. Additional work by the 
Global Forum in providing relevant assistance to developing countries, 
consistent with the G20 emphasis on ensuring that all States benefit 
from improved exchange of information, would help guarantee that 
developing countries are not just providers of information but also 
knowledgeable “consumers” of exchanged information. 130 
5 .7 Summary of existing support for 
transparency and disclosure
Transparency and disclosure are not new to the international tax system. 
The versions of Article 26 of both the United Nations and the OECD 
Model Conventions call for exchanging information “upon request” 
and in recent years, changes made to the provision have enhanced the 
likelihood of effective and useful information exchange taking place. 
Among the most important reforms are: (a) elimination of domestic 
bank secrecy rules as a justification for denying a request for informa-
tion; (b) reduction of the threshold that the requesting State must meet 
to demonstrate that the information requested is “foreseeably relevant 
for carrying out the provisions of [the] Convention or to the admin-
istration or enforcement of the domestic tax laws of the Contracting 
States”; and (c) elimination of the argument that requested information 
 130 See, for example, Communiqué, G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers 
and Central Bank Governors (Moscow, 20 July 2013), available at http://
en.g20russia.ru/events_financial_track/20130719/780961553.html (“All coun-
tries must benefit from the new transparent environment and we call on the 
Global Forum on Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes to work with the 
OECD task force on tax and development, the World Bank Group and others 
to help developing countries identify their need for technical assistance and 
capacity building”); OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange 
of Information for Tax Purposes, Tax Transparency 2013: Report on Progress, 
supra note 129, at 25.
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need not be provided because the requested State itself does not need 
the information. Additionally, the work of the Global Forum, particu-
larly in the peer review process, has the potential to help countries 
seeking to improve their own transparency and disclosure laws (which 
will improve both their own enforcement capacity and their ability to 
participate globally in transparency and disclosure projects). Moreover, 
to the extent that the peer review process improves the transparency 
and disclosure capacity of countries from which a developing coun-
try is seeking information, the developing countries need not expend 
resources to encourage such reform in its partners.
6 . Summary observations regarding the role of 
tax transparency and disclosure in preventing 
base erosion and profit shifting
Base erosion and profit shifting are critical problems for all countries, 
but especially for developing countries that rely significantly on the 
corporate income tax. Although many reforms will be important for a 
successful global response to this challenge, increased transparency and 
disclosure regarding multinational businesses are essential. Countries 
face a number of barriers to achieving this level of transparency and 
disclosure. First, domestic law may not currently require adequate 
reporting regarding financial accounts, cross-border related-party 
transactions, foreign financial assets or foreign business activities. The 
final recommendations from the OECD project on BEPS, in particu-
lar those grounded in Actions 12 and 13, can serve as useful guides for 
countries exploring domestic reform. Additionally, the Global Forum 
peer review process provides a mechanism for both assessing and facili-
tating domestic improvements in transparency and disclosure.
Second, countries may face domestic enforcement impediments 
to their effective acquisition and use of information. Developing coun-
tries that are resource-constrained (for example, limited audit staff, 
limited international tax expertise, limited technological resources) 
might find it difficult to seek and acquire the information necessary to 
effectively audit all of the major multinational businesses operating in 
their jurisdiction. To the extent that proposed reforms can ease any of 
these constraints or burdens, they may be particularly useful to devel-
oping countries. Conversely, if reforms require resources or treaty 
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relationships not currently available to many countries, their formal 
adoption will likely have less impact on resource-constrained States.
Third, effective responses to BEPS will require engagement with 
the broader tax community. Information can be sought directly from 
taxpayers, but often important information will be needed from other 
countries. Thus, the crucial question is whether a State has treaty rela-
tionships (bilateral, TIEA or other) with the countries from which it 
is most likely to need information. If the transparency and disclosure 
reforms rely less on bilateral relationships and more on multilateral 
approaches, jurisdictions with more limited treaty networks can more 
readily enjoy the benefits of the new reforms.
Among the most prominent transparency and disclosure 
reforms currently under way are the documentation reforms in Action 
13 of the OECD Action Plan on BEPS (focused on improved reporting 
for transfer pricing documentation and the global activities of a multi-
national group). The reporting package under Action 13 includes: (a) 
the master file (standardized global information regarding the multi-
national group); (b) the CbC template (which reports selected infor-
mation on a country-by-country basis for the group, along with 
identifying information on entities operating in each jurisdiction); 
and (c) the local file (more country-specific details regarding activities, 
assets, income and related-party transactions). The reporting package 
should help tax administrators assess risk and focus audit efforts. This 
assistance is especially valuable for resource-constrained countries 
seeking to allocate scarce audit resources to their more serious and 
relevant BEPS problems. A number of important issues continue to be 
debated regarding Action 13. The decision to have MNEs provide the 
CbC report only to the residence jurisdiction of the MNE parent (then 
to be shared via treaty), means that developing countries with limited 
treaty networks, or limited resources to pursue treaty requests, or both, 
will face a burden in retrieving the information. At the same time, 
taxpayers have voiced concerns over their own potential documenta-
tion burden, the risks of inadequate data protection and the possibil-
ity that countries could use the information in unintended ways (for 
example, as a replacement for audit).
The OECD project on BEPS is not the sole avenue for potential 
reforms in transparency and disclosure. The OECD and the G20 have 
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advocated for increased use of automatic exchange of information. To 
further this goal, in 2014 the OECD released a proposed Common 
Reporting Standard (CRS) along with a Commentary for automatic 
exchange of information. In October 2014, 51 countries signed a 
Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement under the Multilateral 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters 
committing themselves to automatic exchange; by January 2017, the 
number was over 100. As with the work under Action 13, reforms that 
increase uniform provision of information more directly to States can 
be distinctly advantageous for developing countries trying to maxi-
mize the impact of their available tax administration resources. A crit-
ical question is the ease with which countries can join an automatic 
exchange of information. The multilateral mechanism for sharing 
information best serves States with limited treaty partners. But other 
barriers, including reciprocity, may constrain the ability of develop-
ing countries to participate. Allowing developing countries temporary 
access to automatic exchange on a non-reciprocal basis would enable 
these countries to start tackling base erosion immediately, with rela-
tively little risk to other countries.
Finally, countries can continue to explore the use of existing 
bilateral treaties and TIEAs to seek taxpayer information. The United 
Nations and OECD Model Conventions both incorporate new stand-
ards that reject bank secrecy as a ground for refusing to share informa-
tion and reduce the burden of the requesting State to show the precise 
use of the information sought.
Ultimately, transparency and disclosure of information remain 
vital to the effective enforcement of tax laws in a global economy. All 
countries should be attentive to the existing techniques for obtain-
ing needed information, and should evaluate active reform propos-
als for their relevance, effectiveness and required capacity-building. 
Transparency and disclosure have centre stage in international tax 
policy reform, and the goal is to ensure that the outcomes of this focus 
meaningfully reduce the base erosion and profit shifting faced by juris-
dictions around the world.
